As the earth turns.....Global news....

Spain rejects truce by Basque separatist group
Terror will not define borders, Israel says ahead of talks.

By DANIEL WOOLLS, Associated Press Writer


MADRID – The Spanish government on Monday rejected a new ceasefire announcement by the separatist group ETA and ruled out negotiations on an independent Basque homeland, saying the militants have been decimated by arrests and are desperate to regroup and rearm.

Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba said the ETA cannot be trusted after shattering a 2006 truce with a deadly car bombing. He said its statement Sunday by three hooded militants speaking in a video falls short of what Basque society and other Spaniards demand: that ETA renounce violence for good.

"The word truce, as the idea of a limited peace to open a process of dialogue, is dead," Perez Rubalcaba, adding that Spain will be as tough as ever against ETA.

"The Interior Ministry will keep its anti-terrorism policy intact, absolutely intact. We are not going to change that policy one bit, not a single comma," he told Spanish National Television.

ETA has killed more than 825 people as it fought for an independent homeland in parts of northern Spain and southwestern France since the late 1960s. Its last deadly attack in Spain was in July 2009, when it killed two policemen with a car bomb. Nearly 240 of its members have been arrested since 2008. It is considered a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.

Perez Rubalcaba says the militant group declared the truce because it is so weak it cannot stage attacks.

The cease-fire statement left several key questions unanswered. Besides silence on whether the ETA will surrender its weapons, it did not say if the truce was open-ended and permanent, like the one declared in 2006 and which led to talks with the government, or whether it would halt other activities like extorting money from business leaders or recruiting members.

Nor was there any mention of whether the cease-fire could be monitored by international observers as called for Friday by two Basque parties that back independence: ETA's outlawed political wing Batasuna and a more moderate pro-independence party called Eusko Alkartasuna.

Since late last year, divisions have widened between ETA and the political parties that support it. Jailed ETA veterans have also been distancing themselves from the group, and French police have cracked down, denying militants a neighboring haven.

Friday's statement marked the first time the political groups had put down in writing that they wanted ETA to work toward independence through peaceful means, rather than with violence.

Perez Rubalcaba said Monday that ETA's breaking the 2006 ceasefire — with a massive car bombing at Madrid airport that left two people dead — cost the group credibility even among political supporters who seek Basque independence.

The minister said ETA's new tactic is to seek new negotiations and, if in a few months or a year the government still refuses, ETA will say it has no choice but to revert to bombs or bullets.

He said the ETA wants to impose its will, either through violence or dialogue "and the state is going to tell it time and time again 'no, no and no.'"




`````````````````````````````````

China: Rumors of the Central Bank Chief's Defection

August 30, 2010

Rumors have circulated in China that People’s Bank of China (PBC) Gov. Zhou Xiaochuan may have left the country. The rumors appear to have started following reports on Aug. 28 which cited Ming Pao, a Hong Kong-based news agency, saying that because of an approximately $430 billion loss on U.S. Treasury bonds, the Chinese government may punish some individuals within PBC, including Zhou. Although Ming Pao on Aug. 30 published a report on its website indicating that the prior report was fabricated by a mainland news site that had attributed the false information to Ming Pao, rumors of Zhou’s defection have spread around China intensively, and Zhou’s name has been blocked from Internet search engines in China.

STRATFOR has received no confirmation of the rumor, and reports by state-run Chinese media appeared to send strong indications that Zhou is in no trouble at the moment. However, the release of this rumor and its dispersion throughout the public is significant, particularly as the Communist Party of China (CPC) is preparing for a leadership transition in 2012.

Chinese state-run media and official government websites have run several high-profile reports about Zhou, which should be seen as a move to refute the rumors. The PBC website published two articles on its homepage reporting on Zhou’s meeting with visiting Japanese Financial Services Minister Shozaburo Jimi during the third China-Japan high-level economic dialogue as well as a meeting with an Italian delegation. Xinhua news agency reported that Zhou told the PBC Party Committee Enlargement Meeting on Aug. 30 it should “continue to implement justice, and strengthen legislative work in financial system.” Prior to this news, Zhou appeared at the 2nd annual conference of the heads of the Chinese, Japanese and Korean central banks held on Aug. 3, and his most recent public appearance was Aug. 10 for China’s Financial System Anti-corruption Construction Exhibition.

Zhou is known to have lofty political ambitions and is believed to be a close ally to former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, as well as a core figure for Jiang’s “Shanghai Gang.” There has been no shortage of rumors about Zhou’s possible dismissal in the past five years, as he is believed to be associated with several high-level financial scandals. For example, Zhou was rumored to be under “shuanggui,” a form of house arrest administered by the CPC, during the massive crackdown of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006, which was perceived in the country as a crackdown of the Shanghai Gang and part of Hu’s effort to consolidate power ahead of the 2007 power transition. There was also a rumor that he might have been detained following the investigation and arrest of Wang Yi, the vice governor of the China Development Bank, along with several other officials in the financial circle. Currently, several financial scandals are still under investigation, and it is likely that Zhou, as PBC governor and one of the most powerful economic players in the country, could be associated with some cases. Therefore, whether or not the rumor is true at this time, the leaking of this news is very likely to be associated with a power struggle within the Communist Party’s economic hierarchy.


`````````````````

A Botched Hostage Rescue in the Philippines

August 26, 2010 | 0855 GMT


By Scott Stewart

On Aug. 23, Rolando Mendoza, a former senior police inspector with the Manila police department, boarded a tourist bus in downtown Manila and took control of the vehicle, holding the 25 occupants (tourists from Hong Kong and their Philippine guides) hostage. Mendoza, who was dressed in his police inspector’s uniform, was armed with an M16-type rifle and at least one handgun.

According to the police, Mendoza had been discharged from the department after being charged with extortion. Mendoza claimed the charges were fabricated and had fought a protracted administrative and legal battle in his effort to be reinstated. Apparently, Mendoza’s frustration over this process led to his plan to take the hostages. The fact that Mendoza entertained hope of regaining his police job by breaking the law and taking hostages speaks volumes about his mental state at the time of the incident.

After several hours of negotiation failed to convince Mendoza to surrender, communications broke down, Mendoza began to shoot hostages and police launched a clumsy and prolonged tactical operation to storm the bus. The operation lasted for more than an hour and left Mendoza and eight of the tourists dead at the end of a very public and protracted case of violence stemming from a workplace grievance.

Hostage-rescue operations are some of the most difficult and demanding tactical operations for police and military. To be successful, they require a great deal of training and planning and must be carefully executed. Because of this, hostage-rescue teams are among the most elite police and military units in the world. Since these teams are always training and learning, they pay close attention to operations like the one in Manila and study these operations carefully. They seek to adopt and incorporate tactics and techniques that work and learn from any mistakes that were made so they can avoid repeating them. Even in highly successful operations, there are always areas that can be improved upon and lessons that can be learned.

Indeed, in the Manila case, the events that unfolded provided a litany of lessons for hostage-rescue teams. The case will almost certainly be used in law enforcement and military classrooms across the globe for years as a textbook example of what not to do.


Breakdown of the Incident

Shortly after 10 a.m. on Aug. 23, Mendoza commandeered the bus and its occupants (his police inspector’s uniform was likely helpful in gaining him access to the vehicle). Within minutes, he released two female hostages. Soon thereafter he released four hostages (a woman and three children). Mendoza used a cell phone to call the Manila police, inform them of the situation and make his demands: that the charges against him be dropped by the police ombudsman’s office and that he be reinstated to the police force. These early hostage releases would generally be seen as a positive sign by the authorities, showing that Mendoza had some compassion for the women and children and that even if he was reducing the number of hostages for pragmatic, tactical reasons (to allow him better control over the group), he was at least reducing the number by releasing people and not killing them.

The police maintained communications with Mendoza, who stayed aboard the bus and kept the motor running. This not only kept the vehicle cool, but allowed Mendoza to watch events unfold around the bus on the onboard television set. He had his hostages close the curtains on the bus to make it more difficult for the authorities to determine where he was in the bus.

Shortly after 1 p.m., Mendoza requested more gasoline for the bus and some food. He released another hostage, an elderly man, in return for the gas and food. Two other hostages, both Philippine photographers, were released as a 3 p.m. deadline for action set by Mendoza came and went (one of the photographers was released before, one after). There were also reports that Mendoza had initially set a 12:30 p.m. deadline for action. The fact that these deadlines passed without violence would be an encouraging sign to the authorities that the incident could be resolved without bloodshed. Food was again taken out to the bus just before 5 p.m. During the afternoon, Mendoza could have been engaged by snipers on at least two occasions, but since negotiations were proceeding well and Mendoza did not appear to be close to shooting, the decision was made to try and wait him out and not attempt to kill him. If the snipers failed to incapacitate Mendoza, it could have risked the lives of the hostages.

During the ordeal, Mendoza continued to watch events unfold on the television inside the bus and reportedly even talked to journalists via cell phone. Mendoza also ordered the bus driver to park the vehicle sideways in the center of the road in an apparent attempt to make it more difficult to approach without detection.

Things took a marked turn for the worse around 6:20 p.m., when negotiators, accompanied by Mendoza’s brother Gregorio (who is also a police officer and who had earlier helped convince Mendoza to extend his deadline), approached the bus with a letter from the office of the ombudsman offering to reopen his case. Mendoza rejected the letter, saying he wanted his case dismissed, not reviewed. At this point, there are conflicting reports of what happened. The police negotiators told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that Mendoza’s brother told Mendoza that the letter from the ombudsman’s office was garbage and that he should not surrender. Other press reports indicate that the brother pleaded with Mendoza to take him hostage and release the tourists and that his pleading was seen as counterproductive to the negotiations.

Whatever the story, Mendoza’s brother was then arrested and his arrest was carried live on television and seen by Mendoza in the bus. Shortly after his brother’s arrest, Mendoza fired two warning shots and demanded in a radio interview that all the Manila Police Department SWAT officers be removed from the scene. Shortly after 7 p.m., Mendoza repeated his threats and refused to speak to his family members. Growing increasingly agitated, Mendoza shot two of the hostages when his demand for the SWAT officers to retreat was not met. He released the Philippine bus driver, who reportedly told police that all the hostages were dead. (We are unsure why the driver said this when only two of the passengers had been killed, but the police would have been able to tell from the volume of fire that Mendoza had not truly killed all the hostages.)

At about 7:30 p.m., the tires of the bus were shot out and a police tactical team approached the vehicle and began to smash its windows with a sledgehammer. The police attempted to slowly enter the back of the bus by crawling through one of the shattered windows from the top of a police truck but were forced back out of the window by gunfire.

At about 8:40 p.m., police deployed tear gas into the back of the bus through the missing windows. Gunfire erupted and Mendoza was finally killed in a hail of bullets. Six additional hostages also perished during the exchange of gunfire. It is unclear at this point if they were intentionally shot by Mendoza or if they were caught in the crossfire.


Hostage Situations

By the time of the rescue attempt, the saga of Mendoza’s firing from the police force had been going on for some time, and it is important to recognize that he did not make a spontaneous decision to seize the tourist bus. Even if the bus was targeted shortly before the attack, Mendoza’s path toward violent action would have included several significant warning signs. As in almost any case of violence that stems from issues in the workplace, once the chain of events are examined more closely, reports will emerge that warning signs were either missed or ignored. Had those warning signs been noted and acted upon, this situation might have been avoided.

Since the event was not pre-empted, once it happened and developed into a hostage situation, the primary objective of the authorities was to resolve the incident without violence. Skillful hostage negotiators do this by allowing the hostage-taker to vent. They also work hard to defuse any tension that has the attacker on edge and to gently wear the attacker down to the point of surrender. One of the essential principles in this effort is to isolate the hostage-taker so that he or she cannot receive outside communication, motivation, encouragement or other forms of support. Hostage negotiators seek to control the flow of all information into or out of the crime scene. That did not occur in this case. Mendoza was able to talk to outsiders on his cell phone and even gave media interviews. He was also able to use the television in the bus to watch live media coverage of the incident, including video of the deployment of police officers. This gave him a considerable advantage and far more information than what he could have observed with his eyes from inside the curtained bus.

As shown in the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India, it has become more difficult to isolate assailants from outside communications in the cell phone era, but there are ways that such communications can be disabled. It is not known why the Manila police did not attempt to jam the outside communication signals going to and from the bus, but that is certainly something that will come up in the after-action review, as will their handling of the media and onlookers (one of whom was wounded) during the incident.

As negotiations are proceeding in a hostage situation, the authorities must always be busily preparing to launch an assault in case negotiations fail. When the assailant is agitated or mentally disturbed, the situation on the ground can sometimes change quite rapidly, and the rescue team needs to be prepared to act on a moment’s notice. Usually the team will come in with an initial assault plan and then alter and refine their plan as more intelligence becomes available, and as they become more familiar with the site and the situation.

If the hostages are being held in a building, the rescue team will get the blueprints of the building and collect as much information as possible in an effort to plan their assault on the location where the hostages are being held. In this case, the hostages were being held on a stationary bus, which made it far easier to collect that type of intelligence — a bus is a bus. The authorities also had access to released hostages who, had they been debriefed, could have described to authorities the situation inside the bus.

In a protracted hostage situation, the authorities will frequently employ technical measures to gather additional intelligence on the activities of the hostage-taker. This may involve the use of overt or clandestine video equipment, parabolic microphones or microphones surreptitiously placed in or near the site. Even thermal imaging sets and technical equipment to intercept cell phone communication or radio transmissions are sometimes used.

All the information gleaned from such efforts will not only go to the negotiators, to help them understand the hostage-taker’s frame of mind, but will also be used to help the rescue team fine-tune their assault plan.

Meanwhile, as the assault plan is being tweaked, negotiations continue and the hostage negotiators work to wear down the hostage-taker. It appears that the negotiators in the Mendoza case were doing a fairly good job of keeping the situation calm until the situation flared up involving Mendoza’s brother and the letter from the ombudsman’s office. Authorities clearly erred by not sending him a letter saying they had dropped the case against him. (They did not need the extortion charges now that they could arrest him and charge him with kidnapping and a host of other crimes.) It is hard to understand why the police department quibbled over words and refused to give him the piece of paper he expressly demanded. The police then aggravated the situation greatly with the public arrest of Mendoza’s brother. Those two events caused the situation to deteriorate rapidly and resulted in Mendoza’s decision to begin shooting. Once he shot the first two hostages, the negotiations were clearly over and it was time to implement a tactical solution to the problem.


The Use of Force

In a hostage situation, the use of force is a last resort. If force is required, however, the rescue team needs to hit hard, hit fast and hit accurately. There is little time for hesitation or error: Lives hang in the balance. This is where things began to get very ugly in the Mendoza case. Not only was there a delay between the murder of the first hostages and the launching of the first assault attempt, the assault was not hard, fast or accurate. To succeed, an assault should be dynamic, assume control of the scene by overwhelming force and use surprise and confusion to catch the hostage-taker off guard and quickly incapacitate him. The rescue team needs to dominate the place where the entry is being made and then quickly and accurately shoot the assailant. When the police began to smash the windows of the bus with sledgehammers and then continued to beat on the windows for more than a minute, Mendoza had ample time to kill his hostages had he wished to do so. The only thing that saved the hostages who did survive was Mendoza’s apparent reluctance to kill them.

It appears that the intent of the police was to smash the rear window to provide an opening and then to continue smashing windows as they moved forward in an effort to draw Mendoza’s attention to the front of the bus while the assault team entered from the rear. When the police did attempt to enter the bus using the roof of the police vehicle, however, it was a slow, clumsy attempt that was quickly repelled by Mendoza once he opened fire on the team. They did not enter the bus quickly, and their tepid approach caused them to lose the element of tactical surprise, denied them the opportunity to employ overwhelming force and allowed Mendoza time to think and react and begin firing. There was no hope of the assault team’s dominating the breaching point (or the rest of the bus) when they entered in such a half-hearted manner. Then, instead of following through with the assault by storming the front door while Mendoza was firing at the police in the rear of the bus, the police withdrew and went back to the drawing board. Again, had Mendoza wanted to kill all his remaining hostages, the withdrawal of the assault team gave him ample time to do so.

More than an hour after the first assault, the police again approached the bus and deployed tear gas grenades through the broken windows at the back of the bus. This flushed Mendoza toward the front of the bus and, after a brief exchange of gunfire, he was killed. There were some reports that he was killed by a police sniper, but we have seen no evidence to corroborate those reports, and it appears that he was shot from a relatively short range. Eight of the hostages survived the ordeal.

Granted, a bus does offer some challenges for a takedown operation, but is also a very common form of transportation throughout the world, and there have been numerous hostage situations involving buses in many different countries. Because of this, professional rescue teams frequently practice bus takedowns in much the same way they practice building takedowns or aircraft takedowns.

It was very apparent that the Manila SWAT unit lacked the experience, equipment and training to conduct effective hostage-rescue operations, and we have seen this problem in other local police departments in the developing world. We have not been able to learn why the police did not seek the help of a national-level hostage-rescue unit for the tactical aspect of this situation rather than leaving it to the Manila SWAT team to resolve. Given the prolonged duration of the situation and the location in the nation’s capital, higher-level assets should have had time to deploy to the scene.

Unlike many cases of workplace violence, this one did not involve a disgruntled employee charging into his former office with guns blazing. Instead, Mendoza embarked on a course of action that would, as it turned out, cause a great deal of public humiliation for his former employer. Indeed, the head of the Manila police district tendered his resignation Aug. 24. Four leaders of the Manila SWAT team were also placed on administrative leave.

In the past, some botched rescue attempts have spurred inquiries that have resulted in countries creating or dramatically improving their hostage-rescue capabilities. For example, the failed rescue attempt in Munich in 1972 led to the creation of Germany’s GSG-9, one of the most competent hostage-rescue teams in the world. It will be interesting to see if the Mendoza case spurs similar developments in the Philippines, a country facing a number of security threats.


"A Botched Hostage Rescue in the Philippines is republished with permission of STRATFOR."
href="http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100825_botched_hostage_rescue_philippines">A Botched Hostage Rescue in the Philippines



`````````````````````````````````````````

``Hezbollah, Radical but Rational
August 12, 2010 | 0858 GMT



By Scott Stewart

When we discuss threats along the U.S.-Mexico border with sources and customers, or when we write an analysis on topics such as violence and improvised explosive devices along the border, a certain topic inevitably pops up: Hezbollah.

We frequently hear concerns from U.S. and Mexican government sources about the Iranian and Hezbollah network in Latin America. They fear that Iran would use Hezbollah to strike targets in the Western Hemisphere and even inside the United States if the United States or Israel were to conduct a military strike against Tehran’s nuclear program. Such concerns are expressed not only by our sources and are relayed not only to us. Nearly every time tensions increase between the United States and Iran, the media report that the Hezbollah threat to the United States is growing. Iran also has a vested interest in playing up the danger posed by Hezbollah and its other militant proxies as it tries to dissuade the United States and Israel from attacking its nuclear facilities.

A close look at Hezbollah reveals a potent capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. The group is certainly more capable and could be far more dangerous than al Qaeda. An examination also reveals that Hezbollah has a robust presence in Latin America and that it uses its network there to smuggle people into the United States, where it has long maintained a presence. A balanced look at Hezbollah, however, shows that, while the threat it poses is real — and serious — that threat is not new and it is not likely to be exercised. There are a number of factors that have limited Hezbollah’s use of its international network for terrorist purposes in recent years. A decision to return to such activity would not be made lightly, or without carefully calculating the cost.


Military Capability

When examining Hezbollah, it is important to recognize that it is not just a terrorist group. Certainly, during the 1980s, Hezbollah did gain international recognition from its spectacular and effective attacks using large suicide truck bombs, high-profile airline hijackings and snatching scores of Western hostages (who were sometimes held for years) in Lebanon, but today it is far more than a mere terrorist group. Hezbollah is an influential political party with a strong, well-equipped militia that is more powerful than the army in Lebanon. The organization also operates an extensive network of social service providers in Lebanon and an international finance and logistics network that supports the organization through a global array of legitimate and illicit enterprises.

Militarily, Hezbollah is a force to be reckoned with in Lebanon, as demonstrated by the manner in which it acquitted itself during its last confrontation with Israel in August 2006. While Hezbollah did not defeat Israel, it did manage to make a defensive stand and not be defeated itself. It may have been bloodied and battered by the Israeli onslaught, but at the end of the fight Hezbollah stood unbowed, which signified a major victory for the organization and won it much acclaim in the Muslim world.

The tenacity and training of Hezbollah’s soldiers was readily apparent during the 2006 confrontation. These traits, along with some of the guerrilla warfare skills they demonstrated, such as planning and executing complex ambushes and employing improvised explosive devices against armored vehicles, are things that can be directly applied to terrorist attacks. This was demonstrated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005.

Hezbollah maintains training facilities in places like Nabi Sheet in eastern Lebanon, where its militants are trained by Hezbollah instructors, members of the Syrian army and trainers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force (IRGC-QF) as well as Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). In addition, Hezbollah militants are sent outside Lebanon to Syria and Iran for training on advanced weapons and advanced guerrilla/terrorist tactics. Such advanced training has provided Hezbollah with a large cadre of operatives who are well-schooled in the tradecraft required to operate in a hostile environment and conduct successful terrorist attacks. Their links to Iranian diplomatic facilities guarantee them access to modern weaponry and military-grade explosives that can be brought in via the diplomatic pouch, which is inviolable under international treaty.


Latin American Network

Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons have a presence in Latin America that goes back decades. Iran has sought to establish close relationships with countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Venezuela that have opposed the United States and its foreign policy. STRATFOR sources have confirmed allegations by the U.S. government that the IRGC-QF has a presence in Venezuela and is providing training in irregular warfare to Venezuelan troops as well as militants belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

The Iranians are also known to station IRGC-QF operatives in their embassies under diplomatic cover alongside MOIS intelligence officers. IRGC-QF and MOIS officers also work under non-official cover in businesses, cultural centers and charities and have been known to work closely with Hezbollah operatives. This coordination occurs not only in Lebanon but also in places like Argentina. On March 17, 1992, Hezbollah operatives supported by the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires attacked the Israeli Embassy in that city with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, killing 29 people and injuring hundreds more. On July 18, 1994, 85 people were killed and hundreds injured when Hezbollah operatives supported by the Iranian Embassy attacked the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association building in Buenos Aires. Iran also maintains diplomatic relations with Mexico and uses its official diplomatic presence there to engage Mexico on a range of topics, including commercial relations and international energy matters. (Both countries are major energy producers.)

While Hezbollah has received hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support and military equipment from Iran and Syria, it also has created a global finance and logistics network of its own. The Lebanese people have an entrepreneurial and trading culture that has spread around the world, and Hezbollah has exploited this far-flung Lebanese diaspora (both Christian and Muslim) for fundraising and operational purposes. To assist in this effort, Hezbollah also has partnered with non-Lebanese Arabs and Muslims, both Shia and Sunni, many of whom work with Hezbollah’s network for financial gain and not out of ideological affinity with the group.

Hezbollah’s global commercial network transports and sells counterfeit consumer goods and electronics and pirated movies, music and software. In West Africa, the network also deals in “blood diamonds” from places like Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and fences illegally bunkered oil from the Niger Delta. Cells in Asia procure and ship much of the counterfeit material sold elsewhere; nodes in North America deal in smuggled cigarettes, baby formula and counterfeit designer goods, among other things. In the United States, Hezbollah also has been involved in smuggling pseudoephedrine and selling counterfeit Viagra, and it has had a significant role in the production and worldwide propagation of counterfeit currencies. Hezbollah also has a long-standing and well-known presence in the tri-border region of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, where it earns tens of millions of dollars annually from legal and illegal commercial activities, according to U.S. government estimates.

The Hezbollah business empire also extends into the drug trade. The Bekaa Valley, Lebanon’s central agricultural heartland, is controlled by Hezbollah and serves as a major center for growing poppies and cannabis and for producing heroin from raw materials arriving from places like Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia. Indeed, Hezbollah controls a commanding percentage of the estimated $1 billion drug trade flowing out of the Bekaa. Much of the hashish and heroin emanating from there eventually arrives in Europe, where Hezbollah members also are involved in smuggling, car theft and the distribution of counterfeit goods and currency. Hezbollah operatives in the Western Hemisphere work with Latin American drug cartels to traffic cocaine into the lucrative markets of Europe, and there have been reports of Hezbollah members dealing drugs in the United States.

In recent years, Hezbollah also has become active in Central America and Mexico, the latter being an ideal place for the Iranians and Hezbollah to operate. Mexico has long been a favorite haunt for foreign intelligence officers from countries hostile to the United States, ranging from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, due to its close proximity to the United States and its very poor counterintelligence capability. Mexican government sources have told STRATFOR that the ability of the Mexican government to monitor an organization like Hezbollah is very limited. While Mexico has a domestic intelligence capability, it has historically oriented its efforts toward political opponents of the government and not toward foreign intelligence operatives operating on its soil. This is understandable, considering that the foreign intelligence officers are in Mexico because of its proximity to the United States and not necessarily to spy on Mexico. The Mexican government’s limited counterintelligence capacity has been further reduced by corruption and by the substantial amount of resources the Mexican government has been forced to dedicate to the cartel wars currently ravaging the country.

It is also convenient for Hezbollah that there is some degree of physical resemblance between some Lebanese and Mexican people. Mexicans citizens of Lebanese heritage (like Mexico’s richest man, Carlos Slim) do not look out of place when they are on the street. STRATFOR sources say that Hezbollah members have married Mexican women in order to stay in Mexico, and some have reportedly even adopted Spanish names. A Hezbollah operative with a Spanish name who learns to speak Spanish well can be difficult for a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent to spot. American officials often lack the Spanish skills required to differentiate between Spanish speakers with Mexican accents and those with foreign accents.

Most of the Lebanese residing in Mexico are Maronite Christians who fled Lebanon and who are now well assimilated and prosperous in Mexico. Many of the Lebanese Muslims living in Mexico are relatively recent immigrants, and only about half of them are Shia, so the community in Mexico is smaller than it is in other places. Still, Hezbollah will use it to hide operatives. Sources tell STRATFOR that Hezbollah and the Iranians are involved in several small Islamic centers in Mexican cities such as Torreon, Chihuahua City and Monterrey. They also have an active presence in Shiite Islamic centers in border towns on both sides of the border and use these centers to coordinate cross-border smuggling of contraband and operatives.


Arrestors

Hezbollah has a group of operatives capable of undertaking terrorist missions that is larger and better-trained than any group al Qaeda has ever had. Hezbollah (and its Iranian patrons) have also established a solid foothold in the Americas, and they have demonstrated a capability to use their global logistics network to move operatives and conduct attacks should they so choose. This is what U.S. government officials fear, and what the Iranians want them to fear. The threat posed by Hezbollah’s militant apparatus has always been a serious one, and Hezbollah has long had a significant presence inside the United States. The threat it poses today is not some new, growing phenomenon, as some reports in the press would suggest.

But despite Hezbollah’s transnational terrorism capabilities, it has not chosen to exercise them outside of its home region for many years now. This is due in large part to the way Hezbollah has matured as an organization. It is no longer the new, shadowy organization it was in 1983 but a large global organization with an address. Its assets and personnel can be identified and seized or attacked. Hezbollah understands that a serious terrorist attack or series of attacks on U.S. soil could result in the type of American reaction that followed the 9/11 attack and that the organization would likely end up on the receiving end of the type of campaign that the United States launched against al Qaeda (and Lebanon is far easier to strike than Afghanistan). In the past, Hezbollah (and its Iranian patrons) have worked hard to sow ambiguity and hide responsibility for terrorist attacks, but as Hezbollah matured as an organization, such subterfuge became more difficult.

There is also international public opinion to consider. Hezbollah is a political organization seeking political legitimacy, and it is one thing for it to be seen as a victim of Israeli aggression when standing up to Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and quite another to be seen killing innocent civilians on the other side of the globe.

Hezbollah also sees the United States (and the rest of the Western Hemisphere) as a wonderful place to make money through its array of legal and illegal enterprises. If it angered the United States, its business interests in the Western Hemisphere would be severely impacted. Hezbollah could conduct attacks in the United States, but it would pay a terrible price for doing so, and it does not appear that it is willing to pay that price. The Hezbollah leadership may be radical, but it is not irrational. Many of the senior Hezbollah leaders have matured since the group was founded and have become influential politicians and wealthy businessmen. This older cadre tends to be more moderate than some of the younger firebrands in the organization.

So, while Hezbollah has the capability to attack U.S. interests, it does not currently possess the intent to do so. Its terrorist attacks in Lebanon in the 1980s, like the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and the two attacks against the U.S. Embassy, were intended to drive U.S. influence out of Lebanon, and the attacks largely succeeded. An attack by Hezbollah inside the United States today would result in the return of U.S. attention to, and perhaps even a presence in, Lebanon, something that is clearly not in Hezbollah’s interests.

Then why the recurring rumors of impending Hezbollah terrorist attacks? For several years now, every time there has been talk of a possible attack on Iran there has been a corresponding threat by Iran that it will use its proxy groups in response to such an attack. Iran has also been busy pushing intelligence reports to anybody who will listen, including STRATFOR, that it will activate its militant proxy groups if attacked and, to back up that threat, will periodically send IRGC-QF, MOIS or Hezbollah operatives out to conduct not-so-subtle surveillance of potential targets. (They clearly want to be seen undertaking such activity.)

In many ways, the Hezbollah threat is being played up in order to provide the type of deterrent that mutually assured destruction did during the Cold War. The threats of unleashing Hezbollah terrorist attacks and closing the Strait of Hormuz are the most potent deterrents Iran has to being attacked. Since Iran does not yet possess a nuclear arsenal, these threats are the closest thing it has to a “real nuclear option.” As such, they are threats that Iran will make good on only as a last resort.


"http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100811_hezbollah_radical_rational">Hezbollah, Radical but Rational is republished with permission of STRATFOR.





```````````````````````

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, Again
August 23, 2010 | 1932 GMT


By George Friedman

The Israeli government and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) have agreed to engage in direct peace talks Sept. 2 in Washington. Neither side has expressed any enthusiasm about the talks. In part, this comes from the fact that entering any negotiations with enthusiasm weakens your bargaining position. But the deeper reason is simply that there have been so many peace talks between the two sides and so many failures that it is difficult for a rational person to see much hope in them. Moreover, the failures have not occurred for trivial reasons. They have occurred because of profound divergences in the interests and outlooks of each side.

These particular talks are further flawed because of their origin. Neither side was eager for the talks. They are taking place because the United States wanted them. Indeed, in a certain sense, both sides are talking because they do not want to alienate the United States and because it is easier to talk and fail than it is to refuse to talk.

The United States has wanted Israeli-Palestinian talks since the Palestinians organized themselves into a distinct national movement in the 1970s. Particularly after the successful negotiations between Egypt and Israel and Israel’s implicit long-term understanding with Jordan, an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis appeared to be next on the agenda. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its support for Fatah and other Palestinian groups, a peace process seemed logical and reasonable.

Over time, peace talks became an end in themselves for the United States. The United States has interests throughout the Islamic world. While U.S.-Israeli relations are not the sole point of friction between the Islamic world and the United States, they are certainly one point of friction, particularly on the level of public diplomacy. Indeed, though most Muslim governments may not regard Israel as critical to their national interests, their publics do regard it that way for ideological and religious reasons.

Many Muslim governments therefore engage in a two-level diplomacy: first, publicly condemning Israel and granting public support for the Palestinians as if it were a major issue and, second, quietly ignoring the issue and focusing on other matters of greater direct interest, which often actually involves collaborating with the Israelis. This accounts for the massive difference between the public stance of many governments and their private actions, which can range from indifference to hostility toward Palestinian interests. Countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are all prepared to cooperate deeply with the United States but face hostility from their populations over the matter.

The public pressure on governments is real, and the United States needs to deal with it. The last thing the United States wants to see is relatively cooperative Muslim governments in the region fall due to anti-Israeli or anti-American public sentiment. The issue of Israel and the United States also creates stickiness in the smooth functioning of relations with these countries. The United States wants to minimize this problem.

It should be understood that many Muslim governments would be appalled if the United States broke with Israel and Israel fell. For example, Egypt and Jordan, facing demographic and security issues of their own, are deeply hostile to at least some Palestinian factions. The vast majority of Jordan’s population is actually Palestinian. Egypt struggles with an Islamist movement called the Muslim Brotherhood, which has collaborated with like-minded Islamists among the Palestinians for decades. The countries of the Arabian Peninsula are infinitely more interested in the threat from Iran than in the existence of Israel and, indeed, see Israel as one of the buttresses against Iran. Even Iran is less interested in the destruction of Israel than it is in using the issue as a tool in building its own credibility and influence in the region.

In the Islamic world, public opinion, government rhetoric and government policy have long had a distant kinship. If the United States were actually to do what these countries publicly demand, the private response would be deep concern both about the reliability of the United States and about the consequences of a Palestinian state. A wave of euphoric radicalism could threaten all of these regimes. They quite like the status quo, including the part where they get to condemn the United States for maintaining it.

The United States does not see its relationship with Israel as inhibiting functional state-to-state relationships in the Islamic world, because it hasn’t. Washington paradoxically sees a break with Israel as destabilizing to the region. At the same time, the American government understands the political problems Muslim governments face in working with the United States, in particular the friction created by the American relationship with Israel. While not representing a fundamental challenge to American interests, this friction does represent an issue that must be taken into account and managed.

Peace talks are the American solution. Peace talks give the United States the appearance of seeking to settle the Israeli-Palestinian problem. The comings and goings of American diplomats, treating Palestinians as equals in negotiations and as being equally important to the United States, and the occasional photo op if some agreement is actually reached, all give the United States and pro-American Muslim governments a tool — even if it is not a very effective one — for managing Muslim public opinion. Peace talks also give the United States the ability, on occasion, to criticize Israel publicly, without changing the basic framework of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Most important, they cost the United States nothing. The United States has many diplomats available for multiple-track discussions and working groups for drawing up position papers. Talks do not solve the political problem in the region, but they do reshape perceptions a bit at very little cost. And they give the added benefit that, at some point in the talks, the United States will be able to ask the Europeans to support any solution — or tentative agreement — financially.

Therefore, the Obama administration has been pressuring the Israelis and the PNA, dominated by Fatah, to renew the peace process. Both have been reluctant because, unlike the United States, these talks pose political challenges to the two sides. Peace talks have the nasty habit of triggering internal political crises. Since neither side expects real success, neither government wants to bear the internal political costs that such talks entail. But since the United States is both a major funder of the PNA and Israel’s most significant ally, neither group is in a position to resist the call to talk. And so, after suitable resistance that both sides used for their own ends, the talks begin.

The Israeli problem with the talks is that they force the government to deal with an extraordinarily divided Israeli public. Israel has had weak governments for a generation. These governments are weak because they are formed by coalitions made up of diverse and sometimes opposed parties. In part, this is due to Israel’s electoral system, which increases the likelihood that parties that would never enter the parliament of other countries do sit in the Knesset with a handful of members. There are enough of these that the major parties never come close to a ruling majority and the coalition government that has to be created is crippled from the beginning. An Israeli prime minister spends most of his time avoiding dealing with important issues, since his Cabinet would fall apart if he did.

But the major issue is that the Israeli public is deeply divided ethnically and ideologically, with ideology frequently tracking ethnicity. The original European Jews are often still steeped in the original Zionist vision. But Russian Jews who now comprise roughly one-sixth of the population see the original Zionist plan as alien to them. Then there are the American Jews who moved to Israel for ideological reasons. All these splits and others create an Israel that reminds us of the Fourth French Republic between World War II and the rise of Charles de Gaulle. The term applied to it was “immobilism,” the inability to decide on anything, so it continued to do whatever it was already doing, however ineffective and harmful that course may have been.

Incidentally, Israel wasn’t always this way. After its formation in 1948, Israel’s leaders were all part of the leadership that achieved statehood. That cadre is all gone now, and Israel has yet to transition away from its dependence on its “founding fathers.” Between less trusted leadership and a maddeningly complex political demography, it is no surprise that Israeli politics can be so caustic and churning.

From the point of view of any Israeli foreign minister, the danger of peace talks is that the United States might actually engineer a solution. Any such solution would by definition involve Israeli concessions that would be opposed by a substantial Israeli bloc — and nearly any Israeli faction could derail any agreement. Israeli prime ministers go to the peace talks terrified that the Palestinians might actually get their house in order and be reasonable — leaving it to Israel to stand against an American solution. Had Ariel Sharon not had his stroke, there might have been a strong leader who could wrestle the Israeli political system to the ground and impose a settlement. But at this point, there has not been an Israeli leader since Menachem Begin who could negotiate with confidence in his position. Benjamin Netanyahu finds himself caught between the United States and his severely fractured Cabinet by peace talks.

Fortunately for Netanyahu, the PNA is even more troubled by talks. The Palestinians are deeply divided between two ideological enemies, Fatah and Hamas. Fatah is generally secular and derives from the Soviet-backed Palestinian movement. Having lost its sponsor, it has drifted toward the United States and Europe by default. Its old antagonist, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is still there and still suspicious. Fatah tried to overthrow the kingdom in 1970, and memories are long.

For its part, Hamas is a religious movement, with roots in Egypt and support from Saudi Arabia. Unlike Fatah, Hamas says it is unwilling to recognize the existence of Israel as a legitimate state, and it appears to be quite serious about this. While there seem to be some elements in Hamas that could consider a shift, this is not the consensus view. Iran also provides support, but the Sunni-Shiite split is real and Iran is mostly fishing in troubled waters. Hamas will take help where it can get it, but Hamas is, to a significant degree, funded by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, so getting too close to Iran would create political problems for Hamas’ leadership. In addition, though Cairo has to deal with Hamas because of the Egypt-Gaza border, Cairo is at best deeply suspicions of the group. Egypt sees Hamas as deriving from the same bedrock of forces that gave birth to the Muslim Brotherhood and those who killed Anwar Sadat, forces which pose the greatest future challenge to Egyptian stability. As a result, Egypt continues to be Israel’s silent partner in the blockade of Gaza.

Therefore, the PNA dominated by Fatah in no way speaks for all Palestinians. While Fatah dominates the West Bank, Hamas controls Gaza. Were Fatah to make the kinds of concessions that might make a peace agreement possible, Hamas would not only oppose them but would have the means of scuttling anything that involved Gaza. Making matters worse for Fatah, Hamas does enjoy considerable — if precisely unknown — levels of support in the West Bank, and Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of Fatah and the PNA, is not eager to find out how much in the current super-heated atmosphere.

The most striking agreement between Arabs and Israelis was the Camp David Accords negotiated by U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Those accords were rooted in the 1973 war in which the Israelis were stunned by their own intelligence failures and the extraordinary capabilities shown by the Egyptian army so soon after its crushing defeat in 1967. All of Israel’s comfortable assumptions went out the window. At the same time, Egypt was ultimately defeated, with Israeli troops on the east shore of the Suez Canal.

The Israelis came away with greater respect for Egyptian military power and a decreased confidence in their own. The Egyptians came away with the recognition that however much they had improved, they were defeated in the end. The Israelis weren’t certain they would beat Egypt the next time. The Egyptians were doubtful they could ever beat Israel. For both, a negotiated settlement made sense. The mix of severely shaken confidence and morbid admittance to reality was what permitted Carter to negotiate a settlement that both sides wanted — and could sell to their respective publics.

There has been no similar defining moment in Israeli-Palestinian relations. There is no consensus on either side, nor does either side have a government that can speak authoritatively for the people it represents. On both sides, the rejectionists not only are in a blocking position but are actually in governing roles, and no coalition exists to sweep them aside. The Palestinians are divided by ideology and geography, while the Israelis are “merely” divided by ideology and a political system designed for paralysis.

But the United States wants a peace process, preferably a long one designed to put off the day when it fails. This will allow the United States to appear to be deeply committed to peace and to publicly pressure the Israelis, which will be of some minor use in U.S. efforts to manipulate the rest of the region. But it will not solve anything. Nor is it intended to.

The problem is that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are sufficiently unsettled to make peace. Both Egypt and Israel were shocked and afraid after the 1973 war. Mutual fear is the foundation of peace among enemies. The uncertainty of the future sobers both sides. But the fact right now is that all of the players prefer the status quo to the risks of the future. Hamas doesn’t want to risk its support by negotiating and implicitly recognizing Israel. The PNA doesn’t want to risk a Hamas uprising in the West Bank by making significant concessions. The Israelis don’t want to gamble with unreliable negotiating partners on a settlement that wouldn’t enjoy broad public support in a domestic political environment where even simple programs can get snarled in a morass of ideology. Until reality or some as-yet-uncommitted force shifts the game, it is easier for them — all of them — to do nothing.

But the Americans want talks, and so the talks will begin.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100823_israeli_and_palestinian_pea..."> is republished with permission of STRATFOR.


````````````````````````````````````````````````

Japan's hunt for missing elderly exposes social woes

By Antoni Slodkowski – Sun Aug 22, 10:54 pm ET


TOKYO (Reuters Life!) – A Japanese media frenzy over missing centenarians has cast a spotlight on the isolation and loneliness potentially faced by millions of elderly as the government struggles to cope with a rapidly graying population.

The panic - and guilt - was sparked by the discovery that a man believed Tokyo's oldest male at 111 had actually been dead for over 30 years with his remains found mummified at his home. His family is under investigation for fraud.

Since then authorities have been unable to locate over 250 elderly people and reports have emerged of many old people dying alone, or of relatives running scams to get their pensions amid broken communities and overworked public volunteers.

"Don't worry, my mum-in-law is not a mummy," one relative, Mio Akiyama, jokingly reassured workers of Suginami ward, one of 23 special wards or municipalities of Tokyo, as they were checking on the area's elderly last week.

With investigations underway, officials have found many older people have moved away from their family homes, never to be heard from again, showing how the vulnerable with few friends can easily fall through the cracks of a leaky, support network.

Fusa Furuya of Tokyo's Suginami district, thought to be Tokyo's oldest woman at age 113, was found not be living at the address where she was registered. She has yet to be found and none of her family know her whereabouts.

Her step-granddaughter told Japanese media she had not seen her relative for more than 20 years.

"I feel sad and lonely. I didn't realize that kind of thing can happen in Suginami ward where I live," said 67-year-old retiree Katsuji Yamashiro.

These reports have shocked Japan which is home to an estimated 41,000 centenarians and whose women have held the record for the world's longest life expectancy for 25 years.

"I can't picture a situation where I wouldn't know her whereabouts. Perhaps the breakdown of family ties is the cause of the recent happenings," said Akiyama, holding the hand of her frail, 107-year-old, bed-ridden mother-in-law.

CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE

While Akiyama may show the respect for the elderly that many see as a traditional Japanese value, families are changing and the elderly are no longer automatically cared for by their family.

One-third of Japan's growing ranks of elderly are expected to be living alone by 2020 due to a fast-aging population and more divorces. The government expects over a quarter of its 127 million citizens to be aged over 65 by 2015.

"Until recently, nuclear families were central to Japanese society but now people living alone are replacing this household model," said Akio Doteuchi of NLI Research Institute.

That means a new system is needed to replace traditional home care, Doteuchi said in a recent report.

The need is even greater as Japan battles with too few nursing homes and ballooning healthcare costs.

"Some solutions are already in place but much more has to be done because nuclear families are unable to fulfill their traditional role and the army of elderly is putting a huge pressure on welfare and pension systems," added the researcher.

While cities are having trouble keeping track of their elderly, the problem is less acute in rural areas where social ties often remain strong.

Experts attribute the contrast to the destruction of traditional communities in urban areas, where people can fall under the radar for days before anyone notices.

Experts say the government should do more to fill the gaps.

"Many people have no one to turn to so neighborhoods have to work together to recreate old networks through community centers," said J.F. Oberlin University's Michiko Naoi.

"But people can't do it themselves -- they need support of the government," added the researcher.

In response to such calls, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has launched a pilot program called "Silver Policebox" -- a network of places where older people can come to seek help.

"We are struggling to keep up with the pace of aging of the population but hopefully schemes such as the "Silver Policebox" will help the aged," said Yutaka Muroi of Tokyo City office.

"We will gather data on the missing centenarians by September 28, look at the share of those missing and reasons behind it, and then we can start checking on all people over 65," said Muroi.

"It won't be the end of the search -- it has only begun."

(Reporting by Antoni Slodkowski, Editing by Linda Sieg and Belinda Goldsmith)




``````````````````````````````

Peace this time? Israel, Palestinians to talk

Mixed reaction to Mideast talks Reuters .

By ANNE GEARAN and MATTHEW LEE, Associated Press Writers – Fri Aug 20, 4:47 pm ET
WASHINGTON –


Plunging into the Mideast peacemaker's role that has defeated so many U.S. leaders, President Barack Obama on Friday invited Israel and the Palestinians to try anew in face-to-face talks for a historic agreement to establish an independent Palestinian state and secure peace for Israel.

Negotiations shelved two years ago will resume Sept. 2 in Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said. Obama will host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas for dinner the night before.

The goal: a deal in a year's time on the toughest issues that have sunk previous negotiations, including the borders of a new Palestinian state and the fate of disputed Jerusalem, claimed as a holy capital by both peoples.

"There have been difficulties in the past, there will be difficulties ahead," Clinton said. "Without a doubt, we will hit more obstacles."

Indeed, soon after Clinton's announcement the militant Hamas movement that controls the Gaza Strip, which along with the West Bank is supposed to be part of an eventual Palestinian state, rejected the talks, saying they were based on empty promises.

Winning agreement to at least restart the direct talks makes good on an Obama campaign promise to confront the festering conflict early in his presidency, instead of deferring the peace broker's role as former President George W. Bush did.

Bringing the two sides to Washington for a symbolic handshake also will saddle Obama with one of the world's most intractable problems just when many other things, from a jobless recovery to probable midterm election losses, are not going well.

"This is the Pottery Barn rule for Obama. He owns this now," said Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center who advised presidents during two decades of attempts at a Mideast settlement.

The breakthrough after a nearly two-year hiatus in face-to-face negotiations brings the two sides back to where they were when the last direct talks began in November 2007, near the end of the Bush administration. Those talks broke down after Israel's 2008 military operation in Gaza, followed by Netanyahu's election last year on a much tougher platform than his predecessor.

Friday's announcement came after months of shuttle diplomacy by the Obama administration's Mideast envoy, former Sen. George Mitchell. It also followed a period of chilly U.S. relations with Netanyahu, primarily over expansion of Jewish housing on disputed land.

Under the agreement, Obama will hold separate discussions with Netanyahu and Abbas on Sept. 1 and then host the dinner, which will also be attended by Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah II.

Egypt and Jordan already have peace deals with Israel and will play a crucial support role in the new talks. Also invited is former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the special representative of the "Quartet" of Mideast peacemakers — the U.S., the U.N., the European Union and Russia.

On Sept. 2, Clinton will bring Abbas and Netanyahu together for the first formal round of direct talks since December 2008. At that point the parties will decide where and when to hold later rounds as well as lay out what is to be discussed. U.S. officials have said following rounds are likely to be held in Egypt.

In a choreographed sequence of events, Clinton's announcement came as the Quartet simultaneously issued a statement backing direct talks and Netanyahu's office quickly accepted the proposal.

"Reaching an agreement is a difficult challenge but is possible," it said. "We are coming to the talks with a genuine desire to reach a peace agreement between the two peoples that will protect Israel's national security interests, foremost of which is security."

Abbas enters the talks politically weaker than when he negotiated with Netanyahu's predecessor, Ehud Olmert, in 2007 and 2008.

A formal statement from Abbas' office accepting the invitation was expected late Friday. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said he hoped the Quartet and others would work diligently to ensure the one-year timeframe was achieved and would press Israel to end "provocative acts"

"We hope that the Israeli government would refrain from settlement activities, incursions, siege, closures and provocative acts like demolishing of homes, deporting people from Jerusalem in order to give this peace process the chance it deserves," he said.

But in Gaza, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri rejected the invitation.

"We ... consider this invitation and the promises included in it empty, and it's a new attempt to deceive the Palestinian people and international public opinion," he said.

Abbas' Palestinians had been balking at direct talks, saying not until Israel froze the construction of Jewish settlements.

Israel had rejected that, saying it amounted to placing conditions on the negotiations, and had been demanding a separate invitation from the U.S. A temporary freeze on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank is to expire on Sept. 26.

Mitchell said the United States would step in when talks hit rough patches, offering proposals to bridge gaps "as necessary and appropriate."

"We will be active participants," he said.

It is not clear whether the United States would eventually draft its own peace plan or remain primarily a referee. Also unclear is whether Obama would convene his own high-stakes peace summit, in the mold of Camp David meetings that succeeded, under Jimmy Carter, and failed, under Bill Clinton

```````````````````````````````````````

Pakistan's flood victims endangered by outbreak of epidemic diseases

English.news.cn 2010-08-17 22:58:34
By Syed Moazzam Hashmi

ISLAMABAD, Aug. 17 (Xinhua) -- The life of millions of Pakistan 's flood victims are endangered due to the outbreak of epidemic diseases resulted from the worst floods in the country's history.

At least 29 people were killed due to gastroenteritis disease overnight on Tuesday and 50 others were in critical condition as thousands of affected people were hospitalized across the country, local media reported, citing hospital and official sources.

On Monday, the waterborne gastroenteritis killed 15 people as the epidemic is spreading faster through contaminated flood water, affecting mostly children women and old people.

The United Nations fears 3.5 million children would be affected by various waterborne diseases in Pakistan, while the International Red Cross has indicated a new challenge posing life threat due to the outflow of unexploded explosive material from landmines and other ammunition, particularly in insurgency plagued tribal areas and Kashmir where military operations are in progress.

A spokesman of Pakistani military has said troops have been directed to take preventive measures as the explosive has flown into cities with the floods water.

Over two weeks of heavy rains and floods have so far killed 1, 600 people, displaced 20 million people and destroyed some 900,000 homes across the country, official sources said.

Pakistani Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira told a news conference in the capital city on Monday that registration of flood affected people is in progress. The rescue operations would be accomplished by the end of October whereas damage estimation would be done by Nov. 30. The U.N. believes that the rehabilitation and reconstruction would take at least five years.

The United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon who visited Pakistan on Sunday, had appealed to the world to contribute 460 million dollars. The World Bank has pledged 900 million dollars loan to Pakistan.

Pakistan's Health Ministry has sent a red alert to the World Health Organization (WHO) for starting an emergency treatment against the diseases which are spreading faster along the flowing polluted water which is mixing tap and well water with sewerage and other contamination.

It has estimated that some 36,000 people have been affected by the breakout of cholera alone in Pakistan.

The WHO is preparing a contingency plan to assist Pakistan to prevent major outbreak of a wide range of epidemics, according to UNICEF. WHO projects that up to 1.5 million cases of stomach diseases (including up to 140,000 of cholera), 150,000 cases of measles, 350,000 cases of acute respiratory infections, and up to 100,000 cases of malaria can occur over the next three months.

UNICEF said it plans to provide clean water to 6 million people in Pakistan's flood-stricken area as preventive to the challenge posed by the waterborne diseases. The head of water, sanitation and hygiene for UNICEF in Islamabad, Omar El-Hattab, said that assistance has been reaching one million people per day. "But more funds are urgently required in order to reach all those in need," he added.

The U.N., International Red Cross and other relief organizations have noticed the sluggish pace of international aid release, which, according to analysts, was probably due to ineffective usage of funds in some previous disasters such as the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

According to local media reports, despite consistent rescue operations and relief activities, 5 million of the 20 million flood-affected people are still need to be reached properly while the high-level floods would continue to flow with full intensity for the next four days.

Editor: Mu Xuequan




```````````````````````````````````

The U.S. Withdrawal and Limited Options in Iraq
August 17, 2010 | 0856 GMT


By George Friedman
Stratfor Global Intelligence

It is August 2010, which is the month when the last U.S. combat troops are scheduled to leave Iraq. It is therefore time to take stock of the situation in Iraq, which has changed places with Afghanistan as the forgotten war. This is all the more important since 50,000 troops will remain in Iraq, and while they may not be considered combat troops, a great deal of combat power remains embedded with them. So we are far from the end of the war in Iraq. The question is whether the departure of the last combat units is a significant milestone and, if it is, what it signifies.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with three goals: The first was the destruction of the Iraqi army, the second was the destruction of the Baathist regime and the third was the replacement of that regime with a stable, pro-American government in Baghdad. The first two goals were achieved within weeks. Seven years later, however, Iraq still does not yet have a stable government, let alone a pro-American government. The lack of that government is what puts the current strategy in jeopardy.

The fundamental flaw of the invasion of Iraq was not in its execution but in the political expectations that were put in place. As the Americans knew, the Shiite community was anti-Baathist but heavily influenced by Iranian intelligence. The decision to destroy the Baathists put the Sunnis, who were the backbone of Saddam’s regime, in a desperate position. Facing a hostile American army and an equally hostile Shiite community backed by Iran, the Sunnis faced disaster. Taking support from where they could get it — from the foreign jihadists that were entering Iraq — they launched an insurgency against both the Americans and the Shia.

The Sunnis simply had nothing to lose. In their view, they faced permanent subjugation at best and annihilation at worst. The United States had the option of creating a Shiite-based government but realized that this government would ultimately be under Iranian control. The political miscalculation placed the United States simultaneously into a war with the Sunnis and a near-war situation with many of the Shia, while the Shia and Sunnis waged a civil war among themselves and the Sunnis occasionally fought the Kurds as well. From late 2003 until 2007, the United States was not so much in a state of war in Iraq as it was in a state of chaos.

The new strategy of Gen. David Petraeus emerged from the realization that the United States could not pacify Iraq and be at war with everyone. After a 2006 defeat in the midterm elections, it was expected that U.S. President George W. Bush would order the withdrawal of forces from Iraq. Instead, he announced the surge. The surge was really not much of a surge, but it created psychological surprise — not only were the Americans not leaving, but more were on the way. Anyone who was calculating a position based on the assumption of a U.S. withdrawal had to recalculate.

The Americans understood that the key was reversing the position of the Sunni insurgents. So long as they remained at war with the Americans and Shia, there was no possibility of controlling the situation. Moreover, only the Sunnis could cut the legs out from under the foreign jihadists operating in the Sunni community. These jihadists were challenging the traditional leadership of the Sunni community, so turning this community against the jihadists was not difficult. The Sunnis also were terrified that the United States would withdraw, leaving them at the mercy of the Shia. These considerations, along with substantial sums of money given to Sunni tribal elders, caused the Sunnis to do an about-face. This put the Shia on the defensive, since the Sunni alignment with the Americans enabled the Americans to strike at the Shiite militias.

Petraeus stabilized the situation, but he did not win the war. The war could only be considered won when there was a stable government in Baghdad that actually had the ability to govern Iraq. A government could be formed with people sitting in meetings and talking, but that did not mean that their decisions would have any significance. For that there had to be an Iraqi army to enforce the will of the government and protect the country from its neighbors — particularly Iran (from the American point of view). There also had to be a police force to enforce whatever laws might be made. And from the American perspective, this government did not have to be pro-American (that had long ago disappeared as a viable goal), but it could not be dominated by Iran.

Iraq is not ready to deal with the enforcement of the will of the government because it has no government. Once it has a government, it will be a long time before its military and police forces will be able to enforce its will throughout the country. And it will be much longer before it can block Iranian power by itself. As it stands now, there is no government, so the rest doesn’t much matter.

The geopolitical problem the Americans face is that, with the United States gone, Iran would be the most powerful conventional power in the Persian Gulf. The historical balance of power had been between Iraq and Iran. The American invasion destroyed the Iraqi army and government, and the United States was unable to recreate either. Part of this had to do with the fact that the Iranians did not want the Americans to succeed.

For Iran, a strong Iraq is the geopolitical nightmare. Iran once fought a war with Iraq that cost Iran a million casualties (imagine the United States having more than 4 million casualties), and the foundation of Iranian national strategy is to prevent a repeat of that war by making certain that Iraq becomes a puppet to Iran or, failing that, that it remains weak and divided. At this point, the Iranians do not have the ability to impose a government on Iraq. However, they do have the ability to prevent the formation of a government or to destabilize one that is formed. Iranian intelligence has sufficient allies and resources in Iraq to guarantee the failure of any stabilization attempt that doesn’t please Tehran.

There are many who are baffled by Iranian confidence and defiance in the face of American pressure on the nuclear issue. This is the reason for that confidence: Should the United States attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, or even if the United States does not attack, Iran holds the key to the success of the American strategy in Iraq. Everything done since 2006 fails if the United States must maintain tens of thousands of troops in Iraq in perpetuity. Should the United States leave, Iran has the capability of forcing a new order not only on Iraq but also on the rest of the Persian Gulf. Should the United States stay, Iran has the ability to prevent the stabilization of Iraq, or even to escalate violence to the point that the Americans are drawn back into combat. The Iranians understand the weakness of America’s position in Iraq, and they are confident that they can use that to influence American policy elsewhere.

American and Iraqi officials have publicly said that the reason an Iraqi government has not been formed is Iranian interference. To put it more clearly, there are any number of Shiite politicians who are close to Tehran and, for a range of reasons, will take their orders from there. There are not enough of these politicians to create a government, but there are enough to block a government from being formed. Therefore, no government is being formed.

With 50,000 U.S. troops still in Iraq, the United States does not yet face a crisis. The current withdrawal milestone is not the measure of the success of the strategy. The threat of a crisis will arise if the United States continues its withdrawal to the point where the Shia feel free to launch a sustained and escalating attack on the Sunnis, possibly supported by Iranian forces, volunteers or covert advisers. At that point, the Iraqi government must be in place, be united and command sufficient forces to control the country and deter Iranian plans.

The problem is, as we have seen, that in order to achieve that government there must be Iranian concurrence, and Iran has no reason to want to allow that to happen. Iran has very little to lose by, and a great deal to gain from, continuing the stability the Petraeus strategy provided. The American problem is that a genuine withdrawal from Iraq requires a shift in Iranian policy, and the United States has little to offer Iran to change the policy.

From the Iranian point of view, they have the Americans in a difficult position. On the one hand, the Americans are trumpeting the success of the Petraeus plan in Iraq and trying to repeat the success in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the secret is that the Petraeus plan has not yet succeeded in Iraq. Certainly, it ended the major fighting involving the Americans and settled down Sunni-Shiite tensions. But it has not taken Iraq anywhere near the end state the original strategy envisioned. Iraq has neither a government nor a functional army — and what is blocking it is Tehran.

One impulse of the Americans is to settle with the Iranians militarily. However, Iran is a mountainous country of 70 million, and an invasion is simply not in the cards. Airstrikes are always possible, but as the United States learned over North Vietnam — or from the Battle of Britain or in the bombing of Germany and Japan before the use of nuclear weapons — air campaigns alone don’t usually force nations to capitulate or change their policies. Serbia did give up Kosovo after a three-month air campaign, but we suspect Iran would be a tougher case. In any event, the United States has no appetite for another war while the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are still under way, let alone a war against Iran in order to extricate itself from Iraq. The impulse to use force against Iran was resisted by President Bush and is now being resisted by President Barack Obama. And even if the Israelis attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran could still wreak havoc in Iraq.

Two strategies follow from this. The first is that the United States will reduce U.S. forces in Iraq somewhat but will not complete the withdrawal until a more distant date (the current Status of Forces Agreement requires all American troops to be withdrawn by the end of 2011). The problems with this strategy are that Iran is not going anywhere, destabilizing Iraq is not costing it much and protecting itself from an Iraqi resurgence is Iran’s highest foreign-policy priority. That means that the decision really isn’t whether the United States will delay its withdrawal but whether the United States will permanently base forces in Iraq — and how vulnerable those forces might be to an upsurge in violence, which is an option that Iran retains.

Another choice for the United States, as we have discussed previously, is to enter into negotiations with Iran. This is a distasteful choice from the American point of view, but surely not more distasteful than negotiating with Stalin or Mao. At the same time, the Iranians’ price would be high. At the very least, they would want the “Finlandization” of Iraq, similar to the situation where the Soviets had a degree of control over Finland’s government. And it is far from clear that such a situation in Iraq would be sufficient for the Iranians.

The United States cannot withdraw completely without some arrangement, because that would leave Iran in an extremely powerful position in the region. The Iranian strategy seems to be to make the United States sufficiently uncomfortable to see withdrawal as attractive but not to be so threatening as to deter the withdrawal. As clever as that strategy is, however, it does not hide the fact that Iran would dominate the Persian Gulf region after the withdrawal. Thus, the United States has nothing but unpleasant choices in Iraq. It can stay in perpetuity and remain vulnerable to violence. It can withdraw and hand the region over to Iran. It can go to war with yet another Islamic country. Or it can negotiate with a government that it despises — and which despises it right back.

Given all that has been said about the success of the Petraeus strategy, it must be observed that while it broke the cycle of violence and carved out a fragile stability in Iraq, it has not achieved, nor can it alone achieve, the political solution that would end the war. Nor has it precluded a return of violence at some point. The Petraeus strategy has not solved the fundamental reality that has always been the shadow over Iraq: Iran. But that was beyond Petraeus’ task and, for now, beyond American capabilities. That is why the Iranians can afford to be so confident.


“This report is republished with the permission of STRATFOR: www.STRATFOR.com."


```````````````````


Hezbollah, Radical but Rational
August 12, 2010 | 0858 GMT




By Scott Stewart

When we discuss threats along the U.S./Mexico border with sources and customers, or when we write an analysis on topics such as violence and improvised explosive devices along the border, a certain topic inevitably pops up: Hezbollah.

We frequently hear concerns from U.S. and Mexican government sources about the Iranian and Hezbollah network in Latin America. They fear that Iran would use Hezbollah to strike targets in the Western Hemisphere and even inside the United States if the United States or Israel were to conduct a military strike against Tehran’s nuclear program. Such concerns are expressed not only by our sources and are relayed not only to us. Nearly every time tensions increase between the United States and Iran, the media report that the Hezbollah threat to the United States is growing. Iran also has a vested interest in playing up the danger posed by Hezbollah and its other militant proxies as it tries to dissuade the United States and Israel from attacking its nuclear facilities.

A close look at Hezbollah reveals a potent capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. The group is certainly more capable and could be far more dangerous than al Qaeda. An examination also reveals that Hezbollah has a robust presence in Latin America and that it uses its network there to smuggle people into the United States, where it has long maintained a presence. A balanced look at Hezbollah, however, shows that, while the threat it poses is real — and serious — that threat is not new and it is not likely to be exercised. There are a number of factors that have limited Hezbollah’s use of its international network for terrorist purposes in recent years. A decision to return to such activity would not be made lightly, or without carefully calculating the cost.


Military Capability

When examining Hezbollah, it is important to recognize that it is not just a terrorist group. Certainly, during the 1980s, Hezbollah did gain international recognition from its spectacular and effective attacks using large suicide truck bombs, high-profile airline hijackings and snatching scores of Western hostages (who were sometimes held for years) in Lebanon, but today it is far more than a mere terrorist group. Hezbollah is an influential political party with a strong, well-equipped militia that is more powerful than the army in Lebanon. The organization also operates an extensive network of social service providers in Lebanon and an international finance and logistics network that supports the organization through a global array of legitimate and illicit enterprises.

Militarily, Hezbollah is a force to be reckoned with in Lebanon, as demonstrated by the manner in which it acquitted itself during its last confrontation with Israel, in August 2006. While Hezbollah did not defeat Israel, it did manage to make a defensive stand and not be defeated itself. It may have been bloodied and battered by the Israeli onslaught, but at the end of the fight Hezbollah stood unbowed — which signified a major victory for the organization and won it much acclaim in the Muslim world.

The tenacity and training of Hezbollah’s soldiers was readily apparent during the 2006 confrontation. These traits, along with some of the guerrilla warfare skills they demonstrated such as planning and executing complex ambushes and employing improvised explosive devices against armored vehicles, are things that can be directly applied to terrorist attacks. This was demonstrated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005.

Hezbollah maintains training facilities in places like Nabi Sheet in eastern Lebanon, where its militants are trained by Hezbollah instructors, members of the Syrian army and trainers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force (IRGC-QF) as well as Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). In addition, Hezbollah militants are sent outside Lebanon to Syria and Iran for training on advanced weapons and advanced guerrilla/terrorist tactics. Such advanced training has provided Hezbollah with a large cadre of operatives who are well-schooled in the tradecraft required to operate in a hostile environment and conduct successful terrorist attacks. Their links to Iranian diplomatic facilities guarantee them access to modern weaponry and military-grade explosives that can be brought in via the diplomatic pouch, which is inviolable under international treaty.


Latin American Network

Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons have a presence in Latin America that goes back decades. Iran has sought to establish close relationships with countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Venezuela that have opposed the United States and its foreign policy. STRATFOR sources have confirmed allegations by the U.S. government that the IRGC-QF has a presence in Venezuela and is providing training in irregular warfare to Venezuelan troops as well as militants belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

The Iranians are also known to station IRGC-QF operatives in their embassies under diplomatic cover alongside MOIS intelligence officers. IRGC-QF and MOIS officers also work under non-official cover in businesses, cultural centers and charities and have been known to work closely with Hezbollah operatives. This coordination occurs not only in Lebanon but also in places like Argentina. On March 17, 1992, Hezbollah operatives supported by the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires attacked the Israeli Embassy in that city with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, killing 29 people and injuring hundreds more. On July 18, 1994, 85 people were killed and hundreds injured when Hezbollah operatives supported by the Iranian Embassy attacked the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association building in Buenos Aires. Iran also maintains diplomatic relations with Mexico and uses its official diplomatic presence there to engage Mexico on a range of topics, including commercial relations and international energy matters. (Both countries are major energy producers.)

While Hezbollah has received hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support and military equipment from Iran and Syria, it also has created a global finance and logistics network of its own. The Lebanese people have an entrepreneurial and trading culture that has spread around the world, and Hezbollah has exploited this far-flung Lebanese diaspora (both Christian and Muslim) for fundraising and operational purposes. To assist in this effort, Hezbollah also has partnered with non-Lebanese Arabs and Muslims, both Shiite and Sunni, many of whom work with Hezbollah’s network for financial gain and not out of ideological affinity with the group.

Hezbollah’s global commercial network transports and sells counterfeit consumer goods and electronics and pirated movies, music and software. In West Africa, the network also deals in “blood diamonds” from places like Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and fences illegally bunkered oil from the Niger Delta. Cells in Asia procure and ship much of the counterfeit material sold elsewhere; nodes in North America deal in smuggled cigarettes, baby formula and counterfeit designer goods, among other things. In the United States, Hezbollah also has been involved in smuggling pseudoephedrine and selling counterfeit Viagra, and it has had a significant role in the production and worldwide propagation of counterfeit currencies. Hezbollah also has a long-standing and well-known presence in the tri-border region of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, where it earns tens of millions of dollars annually from legal and illegal commercial activities, according to U.S. government estimates.

The Hezbollah business empire also extends into the drug trade. The Bekaa Valley, Lebanon’s central agricultural heartland, is controlled by Hezbollah and serves as a major center for growing poppies and cannabis and for producing heroin from raw materials arriving from places like Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia. Indeed, Hezbollah controls a commanding percentage of the estimated $1 billion drug trade flowing out of the Bekaa. Much of the hashish and heroin emanating from there eventually arrives in Europe, where Hezbollah members also are involved in smuggling, car theft and the distribution of counterfeit goods and currency. Hezbollah operatives in the Western Hemisphere work with Latin American drug cartels to traffic cocaine into the lucrative markets of Europe, and there have been reports of Hezbollah members dealing drugs in the United States.

In recent years, Hezbollah also has become active in Central America and Mexico, the latter being an ideal place for the Iranians and Hezbollah to operate. Mexico has long been a favorite haunt for foreign intelligence officers from countries hostile to the United States, ranging from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, due to its close proximity to the United States and its very poor counterintelligence capability. Mexican government sources have told STRATFOR that the ability of the Mexican government to monitor an organization like Hezbollah is very limited. While Mexico has a domestic intelligence capability, it has historically oriented its efforts toward political opponents of the government and not toward foreign intelligence operatives operating on its soil. This is understandable, considering that the foreign intelligence officers are in Mexico because of its proximity to the United States and not necessarily to spy on Mexico. The Mexican government’s limited counterintelligence capacity has been further reduced by corruption and by the substantial amount of resources the Mexican government has been forced to dedicate to the cartel wars currently ravaging the country.

It is also convenient for Hezbollah that there is some degree of physical resemblance between some Lebanese and Mexican people. Mexicans citizens of Lebanese heritage (like Mexico’s richest man, Carlos Slim) do not look out of place when they are on the street. STRATFOR sources say that Hezbollah members have married Mexican women in order to stay in Mexico, and some have reportedly even adopted Spanish names. A Hezbollah operative with a Spanish name who learns to speak Spanish well can be difficult for a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent to spot. American officials often lack the Spanish skills required to differentiate between Spanish speakers with Mexican accents and those with foreign accents.

Most of the Lebanese residing in Mexico are Maronite Christians who fled Lebanon and who are now well assimilated and prosperous in Mexico. Many of the Lebanese Muslims living in Mexico are relatively recent immigrants, and only about half of them are Shiite, so the community in Mexico is smaller than it is in other places. Still, Hezbollah will use it to hide operatives. Sources tell STRATFOR that Hezbollah and the Iranians are involved in several small Islamic centers in Mexican cities such as Torreon, Chihuahua City and Monterrey. They also have an active presence in Shiite Islamic centers in border towns on both sides of the border and use these centers to coordinate cross-border smuggling of contraband and operatives.


Arrestors

Hezbollah has a group of operatives capable of undertaking terrorist missions that is larger and better-trained than any group al Qaeda has ever had. Hezbollah (and its Iranian patrons) have also established a solid foothold in the Americas, and they have demonstrated a capability to use their global logistics network to move operatives and conduct attacks should they so choose. This is what U.S. government officials fear, and what the Iranians want them to fear. The threat posed by Hezbollah’s militant apparatus has always been a serious one, and Hezbollah has long had a significant presence inside the United States. The threat it poses today is not some new, growing phenomenon, as some reports in the press would suggest.

But despite Hezbollah’s transnational terrorism capabilities, it has not chosen to exercise them outside of its home region for many years now. This is due in large part to the way Hezbollah has matured as an organization. It is no longer the new, shadowy organization it was in 1983 but a large global organization with an address. Its assets and personnel can be identified and seized or attacked. Hezbollah understands that a serious terrorist attack or series of attacks on U.S. soil could result in the type of American reaction that followed the 9/11 attack and that the organization would likely end up on the receiving end of the type of campaign that the United States launched against al Qaeda (and Lebanon is far easier to strike than Afghanistan). In the past, Hezbollah (and its Iranian patrons) have worked hard to sow ambiguity and hide responsibility for terrorist attacks, but as Hezbollah matured as an organization, such subterfuge became more difficult.

There is also international public opinion to consider. Hezbollah is a political organization seeking political legitimacy, and it is one thing for it to be seen as a victim of Israeli aggression when standing up to Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and quite another to be seen killing innocent civilians on the other side of the globe.

Hezbollah also sees the United States (and the rest of the Western Hemisphere) as a wonderful place to make money through its array of legal and illegal enterprises. If it angered the United States, its business interests in Western Hemisphere would be severely impacted. Hezbollah could conduct attacks in the United States, but it would pay a terrible price for doing so, and it does not appear that it is willing to pay that price. The Hezbollah leadership may be radical, but it is not irrational. Many of the senior Hezbollah leaders have matured since the group was founded and have become influential politicians and wealthy businessmen. This older cadre tends to be more moderate than some of the younger firebrands in the organization.

So, while Hezbollah has the capability to attack U.S. interests, it does not currently possess the intent to do so. Its terrorist attacks in Lebanon in the 1980s, like the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and the two attacks against the U.S. Embassy, were intended to drive U.S. influence out of Lebanon, and the attacks largely succeeded. An attack by Hezbollah inside the United States today would result in the return of U.S. attention to, and perhaps even a presence in, Lebanon, something that is clearly not in Hezbollah’s interests.

Then why the recurring rumors of impending Hezbollah terrorist attacks? For several years now, every time there has been talk of a possible attack on Iran there has been a corresponding threat by Iran that it will use its proxy groups in response to such an attack. Iran has also been busy pushing intelligence reports to anybody who will listen (including STRATFOR) that it will activate its militant proxy groups if attacked and, to back up that threat, will periodically send IRGC-QF, MOIS or Hezbollah operatives out to conduct not-so-subtle surveillance of potential targets. (They clearly want to be seen undertaking such activity.)

In many ways, the Hezbollah threat is being played up in order to provide the type of deterrent that mutually assured destruction did during the Cold War. The threats of unleashing Hezbollah terrorist attacks and closing the Strait of Hormuz are the most potent deterrents Iran has to being attacked. Since Iran does not yet possess a nuclear arsenal, these threats are the closest thing it has to a “real nuclear option.” As such, they are threats that Iran will make good on only as a last resort.






"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Global Intelligence
www.Stratfor.com



``````````````````````````````````````
Drought, Fire and Grain in Russia
August 10, 2010 | 0856 G



By Lauren Goodrich

Three interlocking crises are striking Russia simultaneously: the highest recorded temperatures Russia has seen in 130 years of recordkeeping; the most widespread drought in more than three decades; and massive wildfires that have stretched across seven regions, including Moscow.

The crises threaten the wheat harvest in Russia, which is one of the world’s largest wheat exporters. Russia is no stranger to having drought affect its wheat crop, a commodity of critical importance to Moscow’s domestic tranquility and foreign policy. Despite the severity of the heat, drought and wildfires, Moscow’s wheat output will cover Russia’s domestic needs. Russia will also use the situation to merge its neighbors into a grain cartel.


A History of Drought and Wildfire

Flooding peat bogs appears to be bringing the fires under control. Smoke from the fires has kept Moscow nearly shut down for a week. The larger concern is the effect of the fires — and the continued heat and drought, which has created a state of emergency across 27 regions — on Russia’s ordinarily massive grain harvest and exports.

Russia is one of the largest grain producers and exporters in the world, normally producing around 100 million tons of wheat a year, or 10 percent of total global output. It exports 20 percent of this total to markets in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

Cyclical droughts (and wildfires) mean Russian grain production levels fluctuate between 75 and 100 million tons from year to year. The extent of the drought and wildfires this year has prompted Russian officials to revise the country’s 2010 estimated grain production to 65 million tons, though Russia holds 24 million tons of wheat in storage — meaning it has enough to comfortably cover domestic demand (which is 75 million tons) even if the drought gets worse.

The larger challenge Moscow has faced in years of drought and wildfire has been transporting grain across Russia’s immense territory. Russia’s grain belt lies in the southern European part of the country from the Black Sea across the Northern Caucasus to Western Kazakhstan, capped on the north by the Moscow region. This is Russia’s most fertile region, which is supported by the Volga River.


Though drought and wildfires have struck Russia over the past three years, they have not affected its main grain-producing region. Instead, they struck regions in the Ural area that provide grain for Siberia. Those fires tested Russia’s transit infrastructure, one of its fundamental challenges. Russia has no real transportation network uniting its European heartland and its Far East save one railroad, the Trans-Siberian. While its grain belt does have some of the best transportation infrastructure in the country, it is designed for sending grain to the Black Sea or Europe — not to Siberia. The Kremlin began planning for disruptions of grain shipments to Siberia during the droughts and fires of 2007-2009. During that period, Moscow established massive grain storage units in the Urals and in producing regions of Kazakhstan along the Russian border.

This year’s drought and fires do not primarily affect Russia’s transportation network, but rather the grain-producing regions in the European part of Russia that make up the bulk of Russia’s grain exports. These regions lie on the westward distribution network, with the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea handling more than 50 percent of Russian exports.

Russia has focused largely on being a major grain exporter, raking in more than $4 billion a year for the past three years off the trade. This year, the Kremlin announced Aug. 5 that it would temporarily ban grain exports from Aug. 15 to Dec 31. Two reasons prompted the move. The first is the desire to prevent domestic grain prices from skyrocketing due to feared shortages. Russia’s grain market is remarkably volatile. Grain prices inside Russia already have risen nearly 10 percent. (Globally, wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade have risen nearly 20 percent in the past month, the largest jump since the early 1970s.)

The second reason is that the Kremlin wants to ensure that its supplies and production will hold up should the winter wheat harvest decline as well. Winter wheat, planted beginning at the end of August, typically fully replenishes Russian grain supplies. Further unseasonable heat, drought or fires could damage the winter wheat harvest, meaning the Kremlin will want to curtail exports to ensure its storage silos remain full.

Russia’s conservatism when it comes to ensuring supplies and price stability arises from the reality that adequate grain supplies long have been equated with social stability in Russia. Unlike other commodities, food shortages trigger social and political instability with shocking rapidity in all countries. As do some other countries, Russia relies on grain more than any other foodstuff; other food categories like meat, dairy and vegetables are too perishable for most of Russia to rely on.

Russia’s concentration on food volatility has a long history. Lenin called grain Russia’s “currency of currencies,” and seizing grain stockpiles was one of the Red Army’s first moves during the Russian Revolution. In this tradition, the Kremlin will husband its grain before exporting it for monetary gain. And this falls in line with Russia’s overall economic strategy of using its resources as a tool in domestic and foreign policy.


Exports and Foreign Policy

Russia is a massive producer and exporter of myriad commodities besides grain. It is the largest natural gas producer in the world and one of the largest oil and timber producers. The Russian government and domestic economy are based on the production and export of all these commodities, making Kremlin control — either direct or indirect — of all of these sectors essential to national security.

Domestically, Russians enjoy access to the necessities of life. Kremlin ownership over the majority of the country’s economy and resources gives the government leverage in controlling the country on every level — socially, politically, economically and financially. Thus, a grain crisis is more than just about feeding the people; it strikes at part of Russia’s overall domestic economic security.

Russia’s use of its resources as a tool is also a major part of Kremlin foreign policy. Its massive natural resource wealth and subsequent relative self-sufficiency allows it to project power effectively into the countries around it. Energy has been the main tool in this tactic. Moscow very publicly has used energy supplies as a political weapon, either by raising prices or by cutting supplies. It is also willing to use non-energy trade policy to effect foreign policy ends, and grain exports fall very easily into Moscow’s box of economic tools.

Russia is using the current grain crisis as a foreign policy tool even beyond its own exports, prices and supplies. It has asked both Kazakhstan and Belarus to also temporarily suspend their grain exports. Belarus is a minor grain exporter, with nearly all of its exports going to Russia. But Kazakhstan is one of the top five wheat exporters in the world, traditionally producing 21 million tons of wheat and exporting more than 50 percent of that. The same drought that has struck Russia also has hit Kazakhstan; production there is expected to be slashed by a third, or 7 million tons.

Kazakhstan traditionally exports to southern Siberia, Turkey, Iran and its fellow Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For the first time, Kazakhstan had planned to send grain exports to Asia. It had contracted to send approximately 3 million tons of grain east, with 2 million of those supplies heading to South Korea and the remainder to be split between China and Japan. The drought has forced Kazakhstan to reassess whether it can fulfill those contracts along with contracts for its immediate region.

Russia’s request that Belarus and Kazakhstan cease grain shipments does not seem primarily connected to Russia’s concern over supplies, but instead looks to be more political. The three countries formed a customs union in January, something that has caused much political and economic turmoil. Kazakhstan sought to lock in its president’s desire to remain beholden to Russia even after he steps down, while Belarus reluctantly joined as Russia already controlled more than half of the Belarusian economy.

For Moscow, however, the union was a key piece of its geopolitical resurgence. The Russian-Kazakh-Belarusian customs union was not set up like a Western free trade zone, where the goal is to encourage two-way trade by reducing trade barriers, but as a Russian plan to expand Moscow’s economic hold over Belarus and Kazakhstan. Thus far, the customs union has undermined Belarus and Kazakhstan’s industrial capacity, welding the two states further into the Russian economy.

Since the customs union has been in effect, Russia has quickly turned the club into a political tool, demanding that its fellow members sign onto politically motivated economic targeting of other states. In late July, Russia asked both Kazakhstan and Belarus to join a ban on wine and mineral water from Moldova and Georgia after continued spats with each of the pro-Western countries. Russia has added another level of demands in light of the grain shortages. As of this writing, neither Astana nor Minsk has accepted or declined the demands from Moscow, with grain exporting season just a month away.

Given current Russian production and storage supplies, Russia doesn’t actually need Belarus or Kazakhstan to curb their exports. Instead, it is seeking to use the drought and fires to create a regional grain cartel with its new customs union partners.

And this leads to the question of the other former Soviet grain heavyweight, Ukraine. Ukraine, which does not belong to the customs union, is the world’s third-largest wheat exporter. In 2009, Ukraine exported 21 million tons of its 46 million-ton production. Also hit by the drought, Ukraine revised its projected production and exports for 2010 down 20 percent, with exports down to 16 million tons. Some fear Ukraine will have to slash its export forecasts even further. Moscow will most likely want to control what its large grain-exporting neighbor does, should it be concerned with supplies or prices. Despite Russia’s recent actions with regard to Belarus and Kazakhstan, however, Ukraine has not publicly announced any bans on grain exports.

If Russia is going to exert its political power over the region via grain, it must have Ukraine on board. If Russia can control all of these states’ wheat exports, then Moscow will control 15 percent of global production and 16 percent of global exports. Kiev has recently turned its political orientation to lock step with Moscow, as seen in matters of politics, military and regional spats. But this most recent crisis hits at a major national economic piece for Ukraine. Whether Kiev bends its own national will to continue its further entwinement with Moscow remains to be seen.




"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Global Intelligence
www.Stratfor.com



`````````````````````






Military dog comes home from Iraq traumatized

By DAN ELLIOTT, Associated Press Writer
Tue Aug 3, 5:54 am ET
PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. –

Gina was a playful 2-year-old German shepherd when she went to Iraq as a highly trained bomb-sniffing dog with the military, conducting door-to-door searches and witnessing all sorts of noisy explosions.

She returned home to Colorado cowering and fearful. When her handlers tried to take her into a building, she would stiffen her legs and resist. Once inside, she would tuck her tail beneath her body and slink along the floor. She would hide under furniture or in a corner to avoid people.

A military veterinarian diagnosed with her post-traumatic stress disorder — a condition that experts say can afflict dogs just like it does humans.


"She showed all the symptoms and she had all the signs," said Master Sgt. Eric Haynes, the kennel master at Peterson Air Force Base. "She was terrified of everybody and it was obviously a condition that led her down that road."

A year later, Gina is on the mend. Frequent walks among friendly people and a gradual reintroduction to the noises of military life have begun to overcome her fears, Haynes said.

Haynes describes her progress as "outstanding."

"Pretty fabulous, actually," added Staff Sgt. Melinda Miller, who's been Gina's handler since May. "She makes me look pretty good."

PTSD is well-documented among American servicemen and women returning from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its existence in animals is less clear-cut. Some veterinarians say animals do experience it, or a version of it.

"There is a condition in dogs which is almost precisely the same, if not precisely the same, as PTSD in humans," said Nicholas Dodman, head of the animal behavior program at Tufts University's Cummings School of Veterinary Medicine.

But some veterinarians dislike applying the diagnosis to animals, thinking it demeans servicemen and women, Dodman said. He added that he means no offense to military personnel when he uses the term.

The military defines PTSD as a condition that develops after a life-threatening trauma. Victims suffer three types of experiences long afterward, even in a safe environment. They repeatedly re-experience the trauma in nightmares or vivid memories. They avoid situations or feelings that remind them of the event, and they feel keyed up all the time.

When Gina returned to Peterson last year after her six-month deployment in Iraq, she was no longer the "great little pup" Haynes remembered.

She had been assigned to an Army unit, and her job was to search for explosives after soldiers entered a house. The troops sometimes used noisy, blinding "flash-bang" grenades and kicked down doors, Haynes said, and Gina was once in a convoy when another vehicle was hit by an improvised bomb.

Back home at Peterson, Gina wanted nothing to do with people.

"She'd withdrawn from society as a whole," Haynes said.

Haynes, who has worked with more than 100 dogs in 12 years as a handler and kennel master, said he has seen other dogs rattled by trauma, but none as badly as Gina.

Haynes and other handlers coaxed Gina on walks, sending someone ahead to pass out treats for bystanders to give her. They got her over her fear of walking through doors by stationing someone she knew on the other side to reward her with pats and play. They eased her farther into buildings with the same technique.

"She started learning that everyone wasn't trying to get her," Haynes said. "She began acting more social again."


On a sunny afternoon last week, Gina dashed across her training yard, jumping over obstacles on command and deftly pushing a ball with her forelegs and chest. On a visit to a store on base, she trotted calmly down the aisles and sat quietly when a woman bent to pet her.

"She's such a lovable dog," Miller said, describing how the 61-pound Gina will lie in her lap. "I could literally hold this dog like a baby."

But Haynes said they're careful not to let their affection interfere with good training. Treating Gina like a human — for example, comforting her when she's frightened — can leave her thinking that her handler is pleased when she's afraid.

"She's just gorgeous and I love her, but you also have to balance it with — you have to do what's right," he said.

Gina has resumed some of her duties, searching cars for explosives at Peterson or other nearby military facilities. Eventually, she may be able to return to the kind of hazardous duty she did in Iraq, but that's at least a year away, Haynes said.

"We're not planning on doing it anytime in the near future because obviously, we don't want to mess up everything we've already fixed," he said.

Dodman said he doubts Gina can recover completely.

"It's a fact that fears once learned are never unlearned," Dodman said. "The best thing you can do is apply new learning, which is what (Gina's handlers are) doing," he said.

Haynes acknowledged that's a concern, and although he hopes Gina recovers 100 percent he doesn't know if she will.

"Anytime someone has that much fear about anything, then obviously it will be hard just to get it fixed," he said.

"But, I mean, we don't really have many other options," Haynes said. "You can't really give up on them. They're your partner




``````````````````````

Formation of Al Qaida: US-Israel Collaboration
July 31, 2010 posted by Raja Mujtaba


War on Terror
- SPECIAL REPORT: The top secret Israeli-US program to establish “Al Qaeda” -

By Wayne Madsen in Opinion Maker

Press clips gathered by the CIA and discovered in the National Archives’ stored CIA files point to an agency keenly interested in any leaks about the highly-classified CIA-Mossad program to establish Osama Bin Laden and the most radical elements of the Afghan Mujahidin as the primary leaders of the anti-Soviet rebels in the 1980s.

WMR [Wayne Madsen Report] has pored through the CIA files and a complicated picture emerges of America’s and Israel’s top intelligence agencies, in cahoots with Saudi Arabia, establishing financial links and carve out intelligence programs to provide manpower and financial support to Bin Laden and his allies in Afghanistan. It was these very elements that later created the so-called “Al Qaeda,” which the late British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook described as nothing more than a “database” of CIA front organizations, financial supporters, and field operatives. However, one component omitted by Cook in the Al Qaeda construct is the Israeli participation.

Thanks largely to the CIA station chief in Riyadh in 1986-87, millions of dollars from the Saudi government, particularly then-deputy Prime Minister Prince Abdullah, now King Abdullah, and wealthy Saudi businessmen were funneled to the most radical leader of the Afghan rebels, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, for whom militant southern Philippines Muslim rebels named their organization, the Abu Sayyaf group.

Accounting for only two percent of the mujahidin guerrillas in the field in Afghanistan, Sayyaf’s group began receiving hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of recruits from other countries, more than other six major mujahidin groups fighting the Soviets. The tilt to Sayyaf was a result of the intercession of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Saudi intelligence, the CIA, and Mossad. Another key Saudi intermediary was Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who the Bush family has dubbed “Bandar Bush” because of his close links to the Bushes, and who was the Saudi ambassador to the United States on 9/11.

The Reagan White House’s intermediary with Sayyaf’s group during 1986 and 1987 was Michael Pillsbury, the Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Policy who continues to serve as a Pentagon consultant. Eventually, with the urging of Salem Bin Laden, and his older brother Osama, the CIA gave the green light for Sayyaf to bring into Afghanistan a dedicated group of Arab fighters, recruited from countries such as Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. Some of the Syrian volunteers were refugee survivors of Syrian President Hafez Assad’s massacre of Sunni Muslims in Hama in 1982. Ironically, the first Arab training camp was established in eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistani border and was known as Maasada, or the “Lion’s Den.” Masada is the site of the Roman siege of Jewish forces in 72 where the Jews committed suicide rather than surrender to the Romans. Masada is Hebrew for “fortress.”

Although the roles of Oliver North, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, Iranian Jewish interlocutor and con-artist Manucher Ghorbanifar in using the Israelis as a pass-through for weapons transfers to the Iranians are well-known, not much has been reported on Israel’s role in providing financial and military assistance to Bin Laden’s and Sayyaf’s mujahidin forces at Maasada in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviets.

The CIA kept articles, mainly written by Jack Anderson and Andrew Cockburn, on the highly-classified but leaked CIA-Mossad-Saudi operation. Two CIA front companies, Associate Traders of Vienna, Virginia and Baltimore, Maryland, and Sherwood International Export Company, a license State Department arms broker with offices in Washington, DC, Los Angeles, Miami, and London, arranged for 60,000 rifles, bought for $3.6 million from the Indian Defense Ministry in September 1983, to be shipped with a false end-user certificate for Portugal, to be shipped to “Any UK Port.” In fact, the rifles were actually delivered to Saudi- and Pakistani-controlled mujahidin forces in Afghanistan, including those controlled by Bin Laden and Sayyaf.

Sherwood also used what was believed to be a Mossad front, Shimon Ltd., registered in the Cayman Islands, to ship $1.8 million worth of Brazilian rifles to Nicaraguan contras in Honduras and Costa Rica. Again, a false end-user certificate was used, one that stated the ultimate destination of the Brazilian rifles was Baltimore. Another Israeli firm, Tahal Consulting, and the Israeli ambassador in San Jose, Costa Rica, David Tourgeman, were involved in providing further military logistics support to the contras in Costa Rica and Honduras.

Sherwood’s Cayman Islands subsidiary Cromwell, Ltd., used the same registration agent in the Caymans that was used by Shimon Ltd. Shimon was discovered to have shipped $9.4 million in military equipment to Lagos, Nigeria, a shipment that was actually destined to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA guerrillas in Angola. Joint CIA-Mossad operations to send weapons to guerrilla groups in Asia, Latin America, and Africa was code-named KK MOUNTAIN by the CIA. The specific CIA-Mossad operation to transfer weapons to the Nicaraguan contras and other forces around the world during the 1980s was called Operation Tipped Kettle by the CIA. Among the recipients of Israeli expertise and weapons in Tipped Kettle were the Medellin drug cartel’s death squads and Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega. Tipped Kettle also involved the secret transfer of arms by Israel to Iran. Some of the key Israeli players in Tipped Kettle were Lt. Col. Amatzia Shuali; Noriega adviser Michael Harari; Amiram Nir, counterterrorism adviser to then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres; and former Mossad deputy director general David Kimche.

The money laundering for the arms shipments was conducted through the First National Bank of Maryland in Baltimore, which initiated the money transfers through off-shore banks in the Cayman Islands and Panama. The ultimate destination of the funds was Switzerland, from where the weapons purchases were made without either the CIA’s or Mossad’s fingerprints. Tipped Kettle also involved the laundering of Saudi proceeds for the radical Sayyaf and Bin Laden mujahidin groups through Swiss bank accounts.

Another firm used in Tipped Kettle was Bophuthatswana International Ltd., a joint CIA-Mossad front, with a “do business as” [DBA] name of B International, operating from an office on Madison Avenue in New York. The firm was listed by the Justice Department as a registered agent of the apartheid-era self-proclaimed Republic of Bophuthatswana, an entity only recognized by South Africa. Mossad also used other apartheid republics in South Africa, including Ciskei and Transkei, to mask their illegal weapons smuggling operations. Tipped Kettle also involved the apartheid regime of South Africa and the military dictatorship of Argentina. The network was also used to smuggle arms to Argentina during that nation’s Falklands war with Britain.

CIA’s Operation Tipped Kettle: The trinity of CIA, Mossad, and Saudi Arabia provided weapons and cash to Osama bin Laden and Rasul Sayyaf in Afghanistan during 1980s.

Now, some 25 years later, there appears to be another Mossad weapons smuggling operation, operating with a wink-and-a-nod from Langley, that has appeared in the Pacific Northwest.

An individual named Oliver King was arrested May 19 in Washington State. King, charged with weapons smuggling, was reported to be an Iranian-born citizen of Canada. However, King, 35, is a veteran of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and has alleged links to the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency, according to published press reports. According to a July 15 report in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, King’s McMinnville, Oregon gun shop partner said King told him he was an agent of Mossad. King earlier told an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives that he was a veteran of the IDF.

The Post-Intelligencer reported that INTERPOL records consist of a rap sheet for King that includes convictions for fraud, assault, and weapons charges while living in Denmark. INTERPOL files also reveal that King has claimed phony degrees from the Danish Technical Institution. Seattle-based Assistant U.S. Attorney Susan Roe has insisted that King was born in Iran, although his reported service in the IDF and Mossad would negate such a claim, unless King is an Iranian Jew. King is said to have been born Hamid Malekpour in Tehran.

King was arrested by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents after he was tracked from the Canadian border to his associate’s gun shop in McMinnville, called McMinnville Hunting and Police Supplies, and then to a rented storage unit in Ferndale, Washington, south of Blaine. The gun shop, located at 1000 Office Plaza on Highway 99 West, turned out to be an empty office. The Yamhill Valley News Register reported on May 24 that the gun store serves customers by appointment only. Local McMinnville and Yamhill County law enforcement officials were not aware of the federal investigation of the gun shop, which had failed to re-file for its Oregon state corporate license in February. The situation is reminiscent of local law enforcement seeing local criminal cases against Israeli art students and movers pre-empted by the FBI and other federal agencies before and after 9/11.

From the storage unit, ICE agents seized a sniper rifle, semi-automatic weapons, high-powered scopes, and ammunition from King’s storage unit and car. King is said to have been a resident of Canada since 2003 but his firearm’s dealers license was revoked by Canadian authorities because of suspicions he was smuggling weapons. King’s firearms license in Canada was issued under the name Hamid Malekpour. ICE’s arrest of King capped an investigation that lasted for over a year. A previous search of King’s car at the Blaine, Washington border crossing in February 2009, yielded a resume that claimed King operated businesses in Switzerland, Denmark, and the United States.

An Iranian visa issued this year and two issued last year were found in King’s passport, which was not due to expire until 2013. Subsequently, the passport was revoked for unknown reasons. King gave ICE agents conflicting stories on the reason for his last visit to Iran: consulting for an unnamed company, a hunting trip, and to visit relatives. After the questioning, King returned to his stated home in Vancouver, Canada. The similarities between King’s operations and Operation Tipped Kettle are striking. In the subsequent months, King crossed the border to the U.S. 18 times and said he was visiting a post office in Blaine.

In March of this year, ICE agents witnessed King stop on the shoulder of Interstate 5 and witnessed him performing “counter-surveillance” tactics. On May 19, at the Blaine crossing, King produced a newly-issued Canadian passport, without the Iranian visas that appeared in his original passport. In fact, the new Canadian passport bore the issue date of May 19, the same day King was arrested. King was then arrested at a storage unit in Ferndale after he picked up several boxes from the McMinnville “gun shop.” King claimed he was a “consultant” and that the guns did not belong to him but the owner of the McMinnville gun shop, a man named Amir Zarandi. When arrested, King denied being a Canadian citizen and said that he lived in Seattle. An BATF agent said King told him that he was a veteran of the Israeli army and that he was born in Israel.

King paid the rent for the gun shop with Canadian cashier’s checks and no required federal firearms license logbooks or export licenses for weapons were found when federal agents searched the premises. Agents found no office equipment except for a single stool. Empty boxes from established weapons manufacturers and distributors were found in the shop. McMinnville Hunting and Police Supplies’ actual owner said he met King at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam and said King told him how he got around export controls to move ammunition from Iran to Israel. King also said he knew how to ship guns and ammunition via the Netherlands and Israel to Chile because Israel has no requirement for tracking such shipments. The owner reiterated that King told him that he worked for Mossad.

The Seattle PI also reported that Danish officials had a record of King being born in Germany, not Iran or Israel but also a huge rap sheet, including forgery, violence, assault, offenses against public authorities, fraud, extortion, and violations of Denmark’s weapons laws. King’s attorney, who recently withdrew from the case, said King had official contacts within the CIA, NSA, and Department of Defense prior to his arrest. Roe admitted that a search of King’s computer turned up evidence on “foreign parties” operating in foreign countries. King has been indicted on charges of being an alien in illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and making false statements to federal officers. King remains in federal custody.

Aside from the Seattle P.I., most main stream media has been downplaying King’s Israeli nationality, with KOMO-TV in Seattle reporting on May 26 that King was an Iranian with three Iranian visas in his Canadian passport. No mention was made of Israel. A recent report in the Seattle Times also made no mention of Israel or Mossad. However, Roe has convinced a federal judge to postpone King’s trial, originally scheduled for August 9, because the government is seeking an additional indictment against King and others. Roe says the investigation is complex and involves witnesses in several other countries, including Iran, Denmark, and Canada. But curiusly, Roe did not mention Israel. King fits the profile of an Israeli Unit 269 or Sayeret Matkal agent, a special commando assigned by the IDF to agencies like Mossad to carry out special missions deep within foreign locations.

The King case has all the markings of a renewed Operation Tipped Kettle, with the govermnent dragging its feet on prosecution and the Israeli connection being buried by everyone, save the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. As with the Israeli movers and “art students” detained before and after 9/11, a covert Israeli intelligence operation, involving Iran and U.S. security agencies is being swept under the carpet.

Wayne Madsen is a Washington, DC-based investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. He has written for several renowned papers and blogs.

Madsen is a regular contributor on Russia Today. He has been a frequent political and national security commentator on Fox News and has also appeared on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. Madsen has taken on Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity on their television shows. He has been invited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorism investigation panel of the French government.

As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He subsequently worked for the National Security Agency, the Naval Data Automation Command, Department of State, RCA Corporation, and Computer Sciences Corporation.

Madsen is a member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ), Association for Intelligence Officers (AFIO), and the National Press Club



```````````````````````````````

Brazil offers asylum to Iranian woman facing stoning


By Peter MurphyPosted 2010/07/31 at 5:46 pm EDT
BRASILIA, July 31, 2010 (Reuters) —

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has called on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to allow a woman sentenced in Iran to death by stoning to accept an offer of asylum in Brazil, local media reported.

The sentence imposed on Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani for an extra-marital relationship, which she denies, has caused an international outcry. It has been suspended pending a review by Iran's judiciary but could still be carried out.

"I call on the supreme leader of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to permit Brazil to grant asylum to this woman," state radio reported him as saying on Saturday.

The two nations have drawn closer this year after Brazil pioneered diplomatic efforts backing Iran's uranium enrichment work, which Tehran says it needs to produce power and for medical purposes. Many Western nations believe it is a front for developing a nuclear bomb.

Human rights group Amnesty International said Mohammadi Ashtiani was convicted in 2006 of having an "illicit relationship" with two men and received 99 lashes as her sentence.

Despite this, the rights group said she was subsequently convicted of "adultery while being married," which it said she denied, and for which she was sentenced to death by stoning.

The United States, the European Union, Britain and international human rights groups appealed for a stay of execution.

Earlier this week, in response to an online campaign in Brazil calling on him to intervene, Lula said he could not call on other leaders to disregard the laws of their country.

But his comments on Saturday suggested he was willing to use his strengthened ties with Ahmadinejad to push for clemency for Mohammadi Ashtiani.

"If my friendship with the president of Iran is worth anything and if she is causing unease there, we will willingly receive her here," Agencia Folha reported Lula as saying, adding he said he would call his Iranian counterpart to discuss it.

Lula was speaking during an electoral campaign event for his party's chosen presidential candidate, Dilma Rousseff.

Lula will complete his second term in December and cannot run a third consecutive time in the elections due on October 3.

(Editing by Eric Beech)




````````````````````````````````````````
Thousands Flee Congo Clashes as Security Worsens


Published: July 30, 2010

Filed at 2:45 p.m. ET

KINSHASA (Reuters) -



Almost 90,000 people have fled fighting in eastern Congo in the past month, aid agencies said, underscoring a worsening security situation despite the official end of Congo's 1998-2003 war.

Conflicts between rebel groups, former militias and army troops simmer in Democratic Republic of Congo, and more than 1.9 million people are still displaced, up from 1.6 million in 2009.

"The displaced are in need of protection, food, water, shelters, medicine and non-food items," OCHA, the United Nations aid coordination body, said in a statement Friday.

The aid agency said nearly 90,000 people have fled their homes in Beni territory in the north of Congo's North Kivu province in the past month as a result of the army launching an attack on Islamic Ugandan rebels.

Uganda's Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), formed in 1996 and named on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List, has settled in Congo over the past few years, with their numbers thought to be about 600.

Humanitarian agencies said chaos and disorder prevented them from fully accessing the affected areas, and that many people who have fled are sheltering in schools and churches.

Six civilians have been killed, dozens injured and villages looted, OCHA added.

General Vainquer Mayala, in charge of Congo's national army in North Kivu, said his soldiers had killed 26 and captured 11 rebels.

"They (ADF-NALU) are now hiding in the Ruwenzori mountains and we are soon going to pursue them with combat helicopters," Mayala told Reuters, referring to mountains that lie on either side of the border with Congo and Uganda.

Antonio Gueterres, head of UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, said reforming Congo's security forces was the priority for finally resolving a humanitarian crisis that continues despite post-war elections in 2006 and a flood of investments.

"Congo still faces a dramatic humanitarian situation," Gueterres told reporters at Nyanzale, a camp for 3,000 displaced people in North Kivu, during a visit last week.

Gueterres appealed for the creation of a national army that is disciplined, well paid and respects human rights.

Congo's army -- a patchwork of former government, rebel and militia units -- lacks funding and training and, as a result, is notoriously undisciplined and widely accused of rights abuses.

A United Nations report in May said child soldiers were used by the army in "significant numbers."

Across the country, OCHA says at least 1.69 million have been able to return home in the last 18 months as some areas are pacified, but the numbers of displaced swell as conflict returns to the region, or erupts elsewhere in the mineral-rich giant nation.

(Editing by David Lewis and Michael Roddy)


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Stratfor Global Intelligence


July 29, 2010 | 1231 GMT

King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al Assad made a joint visit to Lebanon on July 29. A large part of their mission is to prevent Hezbollah from causing a crisis over a U.N. special tribunal to probe the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Despite the strong likelihood that the Syrian regime played a role in orchestrating the assassination, Damascus’ diplomatic maneuverings in recent years have largely exonerated the regime from the probe while positioning Syria to reclaim its dominant position in Lebanon.

Hezbollah, however, is not so fortunate. In fact, STRATFOR has received a number of indications that the Syrians, working in league with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, are looking to sacrifice a few Hezbollah operatives in this probe in an effort to limit Hezbollah’s — and by extension Iran’s — influence in Lebanon. To this end, Syria is already making arrangements to prevent any of its pro-Syrian allies in Lebanon from aiding Hezbollah in its time of need.

Though the tribunal report is expected to only indict a small number of Hezbollah members (many of whom have allegedly already left for Tehran to escape potential arrest), Hezbollah appears intent on escalating the situation and is threatening a repeat of the 2008 assault it launched on Sunni-dominated West Beirut. With that assault, Hezbollah demonstrated its ability to paralyze the capital city when decisions made by the Lebanese government or its allies go against the group’s interests. An important player that aided Hezbollah in that assault was the pro-Damascus Syrian National and Social Party (SNSP), which has played a key role in stirring up clashes with Sunnis in West Beirut.

This time around, pro-Syrian proxies in Lebanon are unlikely to support a Hezbollah reprisal. According to a STRATFOR source, the SNSP leadership has recently informed Hezbollah that it has received strict orders from Syria to demobilize and refrain from any domestic military action in support of Hezbollah. The source says that even Wiam Wahhab, the leader of the pro-Syrian Tayyar Al-Tawhid political party, which has also typically backed Hezbollah, has informed the group’s leadership that the party will only support Hezbollah politically but that he cannot offer any military assistance should a domestic conflict ensue.

Al Assad is likely to meet with Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah while in Lebanon and is expected to relay a stern warning to the Hezbollah leadership that the group has run out of options and has little choice but to accept the tribunal results. This does not mean Syria has abandoned Hezbollah, but it is indicative of Syria’s strategic interest in both preventing Hezbollah from becoming too powerful a force in Lebanon and in providing Syria with some credibility in its negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. Should Hezbollah persist in following through with its reprisal plans, it will be doing so with the glaring absence of Syrian support.



``````````````````````

The quality of honesty


Thursday, July 29, 2010
Kamila Hyat

The writer is a freelance columnist and former newspaper editor

The extraordinary ceremony held at the Governor's House in Lahore where a hotel worker from Gilgit was awarded a medal for returning $50,000 in currency notes left behind by a Japanese guest forces one to think.

There is little doubt that the cleaner's act was commendable. For this he was duly rewarded by the hotel. But it is also a fact that he had done, as he himself says, only the right thing. Honesty after all is the expected norm in most parts of the world. The huge fuss made over the act, with the governor presiding over the award-giving ceremony, the chief minister of Gilgit-Baltistan flying in for the occasion and the prime minister apparently due to hand over yet another medal to Isa Khan on Independence Day, underlines the fact that it is apparently so rare a commodity in the country that politicians have been lining up to pay tribute to a man who exhibited it. In many ways this damages Pakistan's image further – making it obvious just how unusual integrity is – rather than enhancing it, as the governor insists is the case. After all, it is virtually inconceivable to imagine a similar ceremony taking place in, say, Switzerland, or even developing countries like Malaysia or Indonesia.

But is honesty really so rare in our nation that people need to be summoned to special ceremonies when it surfaces? Perhaps this is a matter of perception among politicians coloured by their own wrongdoing. It is possibly hard to believe that a poor man would be willing to turn over a huge sum of money when he himself is so eager to gather money in any way he can and as quickly as possible.

This of course is despite the fact that unlike the rather bemused Isa Khan, many of them own palatial homes, a fleet of cars and all kinds of other wealth – large portions of it stowed away overseas. As a result of this greed, public-sector institutions have been looted, dodgy deals of all kinds struck and the possibility of good governance pushed back further.

The near-farcical fanfare over the return of the money makes it seem too that there are perhaps no other honest people in the country, or that, like the Bengal Tiger or the Alaskan Grey Wolf, this is a species in danger of immediate extinction. Many of us know this is not strictly true. While graft is common, as is wrongdoing of various other kinds, with such petty dishonesty affecting millions, there are indeed still those who act with morality.

Cases of rickshaw drivers returning wallets laden with cash or purses being handed over to PIA counters have surfaced from time to time. Even in government departments, people who refuse to be corrupted can often be identified. Many, on the basis of their religious belief, or simply their personal sense of what is right and what is wrong, go about their work with the best intent. It is true that few find themselves in the position Isa Khan did, but it is difficult to say how many would have acted just as he did. Certainly there are those who may have done so – even if their number has fallen through the years.

What we should be doing is asking ourselves why ethics and morality have declined to a level where the attention of top state office-holders is drawn when such qualities are displayed. There are many accounts, told in memoirs, newspaper articles and as anecdotes at gatherings, of how this was not the case some decades ago. Work ethics involved far more diligent labour, bribes were not expected when linesmen repaired telephone wires and shopkeepers attempted to over-charge less often than is the case today.

Ironically enough, the overt displays of religiosity, encouraged through the Ziaul Haq years, have grown on a virtually parallel plane as the dishonesty we see everywhere. The growing climate of corruption has affected many aspects of life, contributing to the growing sense of despondency, even the disgust, of citizens with the prevailing state of affairs and also to a decline in economic growth with few willing to invest in a country where money needs to change hands frequently simply to make things move along.

Small oases of honesty appear still to exist. The Gilgit, Baltistan and Hunza areas are ranked among these – with a carefully preserved community spirit contributing to a situation where in many areas people leave the doors of homes open, informal committees keep a watch to ensure tourists are kept safe and children refuse to accept cash hand-outs offered as 'baksheesh'. This culture may have played a part in Isa Khan's handing back of the money and his comments about how he had never even considered pocketing it. The Motorway Police, which patrol the highway running from Lahore to Peshawar, continue to form yet another oasis – with high standards of vigilance, efficiency and integrity maintained over a decade after the force was created.

We need to think how this culture can be extended and forgotten parts of it retrieved from our past. The tiers of corruption obviously blend in together, with dishonesty at the highest levels contributing to its existence at the middle and the lower levels. The lack of merit in appointments, cronyism and nepotism at almost all places play a part in promoting dishonesty and the mindsets that go along with it.

Accountability within institutions of course plays a further part. The views of schoolchildren who see cheating as an acceptable practice suggest how early the problems start. There is a great deal that has gone amiss. It will take time to set things straight again should the will be found to do so.

But even as things now stand, there is something both farcical and sad about the brouhaha raised over the honesty of a single man. The medals hung around his neck expose our inadequacies as a nation where a simple act of honesty creates such a flurry because it is seen as unexpected or unusual for any citizen to demonstrate such a quality. We need to find our way out of the situation which could easily constitute a scene in a comic film – but should not do so in real life.



Email: kamilahyat@hotmail.com




````````````````````

Iraqi Militants Stealing Blood for the Injured




By TIMOTHY WILLIAMS and YASMINE MOUSA
Published: July 26, 2010


MOSUL, Iraq — Members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia have been holding up blood banks and hospitals at gunpoint, stealing blood for their wounded fighters rather than risk having them arrested at medical facilities, according to Iraqi doctors, employees at health centers and the Sunni insurgents themselves.
A man who claims to be a Qaeda fighter, who identified himself with the nom de guerre of Abu Mustafa al-Mejmai, said insurgents has been compelled to steal blood due to military pressure from American and Iraqi forces. The insurgents, he said, had also established their own clinics staffed by doctors and nurses.
“During the great jihad battles we were wounded severely,” he said. “Therefore we tried to be self-reliant to prevent the mujahedeen from falling into the hands of the invaders.”
The American military has found the remnants of medical clinics in Qaeda strongholds in Diyala Province.
On at least one occasion, insurgents and the police arrived at a Mosul hospital at the same time, said Abu Karam, who works at a blood bank in the city.
“Two men came in and said they were from ‘the state’ and that they wanted a certain blood type,” he said. “I was very scared because four policemen who had brought in an injured colleague were standing nearby. I thought the police and the insurgents had probably been shot in the same incident. The police heard the conversation, yet they did not do anything.”
He added: “I asked the men, ‘From which state are you from?’ They said: ‘We are from the Islamic State of Iraq. Give us the blood without delay.’ I requested the required medical form from them, but they said, ‘Are you new here?’ I answered, ‘Yes.’ So they said, ‘Go ask. Everybody knows us and everybody knows the fate of those who do not cooperate. Do you understand?’ Meanwhile, the police were listening and did not do anything. So I handed them the blood and they left.
“I asked the police, ‘Didn’t you hear what they said?’ The policemen smiled and said, ‘We are not ready to confront them while we have our own injured men waiting for us.’”

Duraid Adnan and Yasir Ghazi contributed reporting from Baghdad, and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Nineveh, Diyala, Salahuddin and Anbar Provinces.



``````````````````````````````````


America rules out military action against Venezuela




‘Among our people there are very few cowards, few men and women who tremble before the imperial threat’


Tuesday, July 27, 2010
WASHINGTON/ SANTA CLARA, Cuba:


The United States on Monday ruled out military action against Venezuela after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez threatened to cut off oil supplies to the US if it backed a Colombian attack.

“As we have stated in the past, the United States has no intention of engaging in military action against Venezuela,” Virginia Staab, a State Department spokeswoman, told AFP.

“The United States has long enjoyed a mutually beneficial energy relationship with Venezuela, and we wish to see that relationship continue,” she said.

Importing 1.4 million barrels of oil a day, the United States is the main oil consumer of Venezuela, a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and South America’s largest oil producer and exporter.

Chavez, Venezuela’s anti-American leftist president, said on Sunday he had intelligence that “the possibility of an armed aggression against Venezuelan territory from Colombia” was higher than it has been “in 100 years.” If Colombia were to launch an attack “promoted by the Yankee Empire, we would suspend oil deliveries to the United States, even if everybody over here has to eat stones,” he warned.

Chavez broke off diplomatic relations with Bogota on Thursday in response to charges by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe that 1,500 Colombian guerrillas had set up camp inside Venezuela and were launching attacks from its territory.

“We encourage Colombia and Venezuela to work through dialogue and diplomacy to ensure their shared border is secure and peaceful,” Staab said.

“The information presented by Colombia concerning a continuing presence by illegal armed groups in Venezuela merits a thorough investigation by competent international entities,” she said.

The United States has thrown its support behind its key ally, saying Colombia’s allegations that Venezuela was harboring Colombian rebels “need to be taken very seriously.”

Meanwhile, a top Venezuelan official stoked rising tensions with Colombia late on Monday, warning that his government was not afraid of war if it comes under attack. Electricity Minister Ali Rodriguez said Bogota’s accusations that Venezuela is harbouring Colombian guerrilla leaders were a “foul, vulgar and offensive pretext to attack Venezuela and attack the libertarian processes in our continent.”

Rodriguez made the comments at ceremonies marking the 57th anniversary of the start of the Cuban revolution, as tensions escalated between Venezuela and Colombia.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last week broke off relations with Colombia and on Sunday cancelled a trip to Cuba, claiming the risk of a Colombian attack has never been greater.

Rodriguez said his country loved peace, but “we do no fear war if it is imposed on us.”

“If they force us, the imperialists should know that among our people there are very few cowards, few men and women who tremble before the imperial threat,” he said.





``````````````````````````````````````

South China Sea: The coming war?

Five things you need to know about one of the world's most dangerous places.

By Jonathan Adams
Published: June 27, 2010 06:49 ET in Asia


Frontier soldiers take part in a training on the beach of Sanya, south China's Hainan province, Nov. 15, 2006. (China Daily/Reuters) China has built up its small military presence in the Spratlys. It angered Vietnam by issuing a unilateral fishing ban in the South China Sea, then boarding and seizing Vietnamese fishing boats who did not observe that ban.

Longer-term, China is building up a massive naval base on its southern island of Hainan from which it will be able to project power into the South China Sea. The base will house China's new nuclear-armed submarines, as well as its first aircraft carrier, expected to enter service by 2012, and many other warships.

Perhaps most significantly, China has recently begun to define its claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea as a "core interest," say analysts, using new language that puts the sea on par with Beijing's claims over Taiwan and Tibet. Veteran China watcher Willy Lam calls it part of China's "red-line diplomacy."

"These red lines define China's core interests," said Lam at a recent talk in Taipei. "Now, China is increasing its core interests. The latest development is that China also considers the South China Sea as its 'core interest' — it's asking the U.S. and other countries not to interfere with its 'core interests' in the South China Sea. It's drawing red lines around the entire sea."

Wendell Minnick, Asia bureau chief for Defense News, wrote in an email that Gates' remarks in Singapore were a "surprise."

"Clearly China's decision to include the South China Sea as a 'core interest' is something unnerving," said Minnick.

Southeast Asian nations are also increasingly worried, according to Arthur Ding, a Taiwan expert on military issues who also attended the Singapore conference. He said he's heard rising concerns from southeast Asian officials, especially those from Vietnam and the Philippines, about China's growing "assertiveness."

And he highlighted Chinese general Ma Xiaotian's mention of the South China Sea in a Q&A session in Singapore.

"The South China Sea had become so quiet, or at least not as much of an issue as the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula," said Ding. "So this [Ma's remarks] really surprised me."

4) What are the most plausible conflict scenarios?

One worry is an incident at sea — say, a collision between a U.S. surveillance ship and a People's Liberation Army ship leading to loss of life — that could escalate due to miscalculation and lack of communication. One such incident took place in 2001 between a U.S. spy-plane and a Chinese fighter jet. The U.S. and Chinese militaries established a hotline in 2008, but China often simply refuses to pick up the phone out of pique, according to a recent Defense News report.

But the nations most likely to come to blows in the South China Sea may be China and Vietnam. Hanoi was incensed by Beijing's treatment of its fishing boats last year and lodged a formal protest. It continues to see the Paracels as its territory, illegally occupied by the Chinese. Anti-China nationalism runs strong in Vietnam and is easily inflamed. The two nations' militaries have twice skirmished in the South China Sea, in 1974 and 1988.

China's moves appear to have already started a regional arms race, analysts say. "Some southeast Asian nations are starting to beef up their armed forces to hedge growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea," wrote Ian Storey, fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, in a recent commentary.

Defense News' Minnick said that Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam had "gotten into the submarine game," and that "there are more concerns of an underwater collision than an accidental war" in the South China Sea.

"Many of the countries now deploying submarines are not familiar with underwater rules of right of way," Minnick said. "There are clear demarcations for direction and depth that are not being followed by some of the more inexperienced countries. And then there's Chinese submarines roaming around as well. So it's getting crowded underwater."

Meanwhile, one side effect of China's new claim may be to strengthen the U.S.' budding ties with Vietnam. "The U.S. is moving closer to Vietnam, and better military-to-military relations are expected to improve this year as China rattles the saber more," said Minnick.

5) Are there any efforts to resolve South China Sea disputes?

In 2002 the concerned nations signed a "code of conduct" agreement on the South China Sea. But the deal hasn't yet been fully implemented, largely due to China, analysts say. "China perceives the South China Sea as its territory, so it thinks 'Why do I have to implement the code of conduct?'" said Ding, the Taiwanese expert.

Last year, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their formal claims to territory in the South China Sea. China immediately protested, rendering the claims invalid, a move that further ratcheted up ill will. The issue has quieted down in recent months, but the underlying territorial disagreements are far from being resolved.

"Somehow, ways must be found to prevent emotive nationalism and militarism from upsetting the uneasy status quo in the South China Sea," wrote the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies' Richardson.




```````````````````````````````````````````````

Italy's white-collar mafia


How the Italian mafia turned from massacres to stealth operations and political infiltrations.


By Fulvio Paolocci — Special to GlobalPost
Published: July 25, 2010 08:16 ET in Europe


ROME, Italy


This week, Italy commemorates the cold-blooded murders of two anti-Mafia heroes. Eighteen years ago, Judge Paolo Borsellino was blown to pieces in full daylight when a small Fiat car, loaded with TNT, detonated in front of his mother’s house in Palermo, Sicily.

Weeks earlier, his colleague and friend, Judge Giovanni Falcone was killed by the Sicilian Mafia — Cosa Nostra — in a similar attack. It was the summer of 1992, the darkest and bloodiest time in the history of Italy’s war against the mob.

The public outrage that followed the judges’ deaths pushed the Mafia to reconsider its tactics.

Since then, Italian organized crime — Cosa Nostra in Sicily, the Camorra in Naples and the 'Ndrangheta in Calabria — have shifted from open massacres of public servants to stealth negotiations and the infiltration of Italian institutions. Because of this, experts say, the truth about those murders never surfaced.

“There is no doubt that those Mafia attacks were accomplished with the help of the Italian Secret Services,” said Francesco Forgione, the former president of the Anti Mafia Parliament Committee. “The state maintained a dialogue with the Mafia during those attacks,” he said. “We are still waiting for the truth.”

"Today’s Mafia are people with college degree; we call them the white-collar Mafia. They are professionals in jacket and tie who understand finance and sit at the same table with politicians and businessmen." — Luigi De Magistris

Today, the 'Ndrangheta is Europe’s exclusive broker for cocaine traffic from South America. “They are the only Italian criminal organization connected to the new Mexican narcos,” Forgione said.

In Italy, they have chosen Milan as their financial hub. Forgione said that explained why Milan had the highest cocaine consumption rates in Europe.

The Italian police and Carabinieri forces last week arrested more than 300 affiliates of the 'Ndrangheta — from Calabria to the Milan region of Lombardy. In an overnight raid on July 13, called “Operation Crime,” 3,000 members of the armed forces were deployed for the most important blow to organized crime in the last 10 years. Among the arrested was Domenico Oppedisano, an 80-year-old godfather who was the alleged head of the organization.

“It was an exceptional operation,” said Piero Grasso, the head of Italy’s Anti Mafia Task Force, who summoned reporters at a press conference last week.

“The current 'Ndrangheta is a top-down, tight-knit and pyramid-like organization,” Grasso said, comparing it to the modus operandi of Cosa Nostra in Sicily.

Investigators focused on the bids that were made on the Milan Universal Expo scheduled in 2015. The winning bids would have gained control over massive development projects that would transform 420 acres of semi-industrial land into a state-of–the-art conference center in the outskirts of Milan.

With the help of local wheeler-dealers and politicians, the 'Ndrangheta was using the Milan-based company Perego General Contractors to elbow its way into the Milan bid. Using the same company name, the 'Ndrangheta was also caught attempting to infiltrate projects in the rebuilding of l’Aquila after the city was hit by a 6.3-magnitude earthquake in April 2009.

The daily Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera reported that Perego had become the preferred tool of the Strangio family, a powerful 'Ndrangheta dynasty that exploited Perego’s clean record to win multi-million-euro bids in the entire Milan region.

Last week’s raid was a rude awakening for northern Italy, which realized how deeply the Calabria 'Ndrangheta had infiltrated their local economy.


``````````````````````````````````````````````````````````

EU tightens screw on Iran with extra sanction

July 26, 2010 12:44 ET By Luke Baker

BRUSSELS (Reuters) -



EU foreign ministers approved tighter sanctions on Iran over its disputed nuclear program on Monday, with steps to block oil and gas investment and curtail Tehran's refining and natural gas capability.

The measures go well beyond sanctions imposed by the United Nations last month and mirror steps taken by the United States in recent weeks to apply extra pressure on Tehran to return to negotiations over its uranium enrichment program.

As well as adopting harsher sanctions, including targeting Iranian banks and insurance companies, the foreign ministers called on Iran to resume talks over its enrichment work, which Western powers see as a veiled quest to develop nuclear weapons.

"This is increased pressure on Iran to enter into negotiations about their whole nuclear program," British Foreign Secretary William Hague told reporters as he arrived for the meeting in Brussels and before the measures were approved.

"I hope Iran takes from this message that European nations are open to negotiations about the nuclear program, but if they don't respond, we will intensify the pressure."

The extra sanctions, which also limit dealings with Iran's state shipping company and air cargo transporters, will not legally come into force until they are published in the European Union's official journal on Tuesday, diplomats said.

"The annex is extremely detailed and sets out precisely which Iranian entities -- banks, insurance companies, shipping and cargo lines -- are blocked," one diplomat said. "Once it's published, there is a legal obligation to comply."

Perhaps the hardest-hitting element of the sanctions is the move to prohibit new investment in and technical assistance to Iran's refining, liquefaction and liquefied natural gas sectors, which are a mainstay of Iran's energy-based economy.

Iran denies it is enriching uranium to fuel atomic bombs, saying the program is for energy and medical purposes only.

PRESSURE AND DIPLOMACY ALIKE

The broadened sanctions are intended to put strong financial heat on Iran, which is the world's fifth largest crude oil exporter but has little refining capability and depends on gasoline imports for domestic consumption.

Diplomats have also acknowledged, however, that the impact of the sanctions will depend on steps to ensure compliance.

Traders said this month Iran was depending more on friendly countries for fuel supplies to sidestep sanctions intended to hinder its fuel imports, and was buying about half of its July gasoline imports from Turkey and the rest from Chinese sellers.

But analysts said that while countries such as China, Turkey and Malaysia might step in to furnish Iran with goods it would now not be able to get from the European Union, the EU's sanctions were still well-enough designed to be effective.

"Most of the sectors that have been targeted in the EU sanctions are ones over which Europeans have a substantial leverage," Mark Fitzpatrick, an Iran specialist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told Reuters.

"Not so many other countries can provide the kind of financial services that will be cut off. Few other countries supply technology for liquefied natural gas, nobody else does re-insurance...The European Union has very wisely found areas over which it has real leverage and cannot be supplanted."

As part of its "dual-track" approach twinning sanctions and diplomacy, however, the EU is also hoping that Iran will agree to resume long-moribund negotiations in the coming weeks.

The EU foreign affairs chief, Catherine Ashton, and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, have exchanged letters in the last few weeksa and it looks possible that they will meet for talks as early as September, diplomats say.

But Iran experts caution that any resumption of talks -- the first negotiations with the West since October 2009 -- are unlikely to produce quick results, rather more likely to begin a lengthy process of Iran maneuvering to get sanctions lifted and the West seeking a moratorium on its uranium enrichment.

The Islamic Republic has said that it has an inalienable right to its own nuclear development for peaceful purposes without restrictions and this will not be negotiable.

(Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom and Justyna Pawlak; Editing by Mark Heinrich)


```````````````````````````````````````

Headline News

Gaza rockets pound southern Israel

Palestinian terrorists operating out of the Gaza Strip fired four rockets and two mortar shells at communities in southern Israel on Saturday.

There were no injuries in any of the attacks, as all the projectiles landed just outside local Israeli villages.

Defense officials noted that at least one of the Palestinian rockets was manufactured in a very professional manner, and they believe it had been imported into the Hamas-controlled territory.

Israeli officials have been warning for months and even years that despite international guarantees and feeble efforts to prevent arms smuggling into Gaza, terrorists based there has managed to acquire large quantities of long and short-range weapons. The presence of these weapons will inevitably lead to renewed open warfare in the area.



Israeli volleyball team attacked in Turkey
An Israeli women's volleyball team was assailed by violent protestors while playing an international match against Serbia in the Turkish capital of Ankara on Saturday.

Turkish rioters carrying Palestinian flags clashed with a large police force deployed at the event. The demonstrators also carried posters of Furkan Dogan, the youngest of nine so-called "peace activists" who were killed while attacking an Israeli boarding party that intercepted a Turkish-sponsored flotilla trying to break the maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Israel last week lifted a travel advisory warning Israelis not to visit Turkey in the wake of the May 31 flotilla incident. Saturday's attack suggested the travel advisory may have been lifted prematurely, and that Israelis visiting Turkey could still find themselves in danger simply for being Israeli.

Turkish hostility toward Israel has been mounting for some time, and the flotilla incident was merely an excuse to escalate it further. In February of this year, months before the flotilla incident, an Israeli basketball team playing in Turkey was pelted with glass bottles and forced to flee the court during a game.




``````````````````````````````````````````````````````````

‘Russia-France deal to go on if it includes tech transfer’




Sunday, July 25, 2010
MOSCOW: Russia’s top naval commander on Saturday insisted the purchase of French warships would only go ahead if it included a transfer of technology, warning otherwise there was “no point” to the deal.

The comments by Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky came a day after French President Nicolas Sarkozy assured workers at a French shipyard that the decision to seal the deal with Russia was “certain”.

“What is important here is to obtain the possibility of a transfer of key, fundamental technologies... not just in ship building but in several other areas,” Vysotsky told the Echo of Moscow radio.

“This is without doubt the main condition for this transaction. If this does not happen then there is no point in undertaking this,” he added.

“We do not need the ship but we do need its possibilities. “We need its equipment. The point of the ship is in its absolute multi-functionality,” he said.

Russia has been negotiating with France for months to buy the Mistral-class helicopter carriers but the deal has yet to be finalised, with the issue of technology transfer apparently the main sticking point.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told AFP last month that Moscow would only go ahead with the deal if it included a transfer of the technology that makes the Mistral one of the most powerful in the French fleet.

However Vysotsky’s statement is the bluntest yet from a Russian military official about where Moscow sees its interests in the deal. The deal would be the first sale of advanced military hardware to Russia by a Nato country and the sale has worried ex-Soviet states who now have tense ties with Russia, as well as some lawmakers in the United States.

Vysotsky said that other countries possessed technologies which Russia does not have and officials were “being crafty” if they claimed that Russia could develop these on its own. Purchase of the ships and their equipment is seen as a major pillar in Russia’s strategy to transform its armed forces from a structure inherited from the Soviet Union into a modern and dynamic fighting force.

The ships cost around 500 million euros (600 million dollars) each and Russia would purchase up to four of the vessels and also obtain the right to manufacture more at its own shipyards. Vysotsky confirmed that the deal was now being overseen by one of Russia’s most powerful figures and close Putin ally, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who media expect to drive a hard bargain on the issue.





``````````````````````````````````````````````

Part of the maneuver : the U.S.S. George Washington. Source: AP

HB SEOUL . North Korea threatens South Korea and the United States for a joint maneuver with " holy war ". The military exercise starting on Sunday was a provocation and "so irresponsible as the awakening of a sleeping tiger , " the official North Korean Central News Agency KCNA spread on Saturday a declaration of the powerful Defence . "On the basis of nuclear deterrence of the DPRK army and people are always ready for a holy war to counter the U.S. imperialists and their South Korean puppet army , which drive the situation on purpose to the brink of war. "

The U.S. rejected the threats from Pyongyang. "We need less provocative words from North Korea and more constructive action, " said Foreign Ministry spokesman JP Crowley in Washington. North Korea accompanied maneuvers of the United States and South Korea regularly with shrill tones. U.S. officials hold this time for possible further provocations , as prepared by the Communist-ruled north, apparently on a replacement for leader Kim Jong- Il.

Since the sinking of a South Korean warship in March , tensions on the Korean Peninsula have increased. North Korea has rejected claims from the South to have fired a torpedo at the corvette " Cheonan . In the incident, 46 South Korean sailors were killed.

However, North Korea on Saturday expressed readiness to resume the six-party disarmament talks with South Korea , China , Japan , Russia and the USA. New sanctions, as they had Hillary Clinton announced on Thursday would not tolerate the north, however . "We are in dialogue and ready for war , "said the Foreign Ministry.




```````````````````````````````````````````````

Today is Friday, July 23, the 204th day of 2010. There are 161 days left in the year.


Today's Highlight in History:

In 1914, Austria-Hungary issued a list of demands to Serbia following the killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb assassin; the dispute led to World War I.(because of this one man..how many men, civilians got killed?)


On July 23, 1885, Ulysses S. Grant, the 18th president of the United States, died in Mount McGregor, N.Y. at age 63.


In 1892, Emperor Haile Selassie (HY'-lee suh-LAH'-see) of Ethiopia was born.


In 1945, French Marshal HenriPetain (ahn-REE' pay-TAN'), who had headed the Vichy (vee-shee) government during World War II, went on trial, charged with treason. (He was convicted and condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted; Petain died in prison on this date in 1951.)

In 1952, Egyptian military officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a successful coup against King Farouk I.

In 1958, Britain's Queen Elizabeth II named the first four women to peerage in the House of Lords.

In 1967, a week of deadly race-related rioting that claimed 43 lives erupted in Detroit.

In 1977, a jury in Washington, D.C. convicted 12 Hanafi (hah-NAH'-fee) Muslims of charges stemming from the hostage siege at three buildings the previous March.

In 1985, Commodore International Ltd. unveiled its Amiga 1000 personal computer during a press event at New York's Lincoln Center. Bandleader Kay Kyser, known for his "Kollege of Musical Knowledge," died in Chapel Hill, N.C. (sources differ on whether he was 79 or 80).

In 1986, Britain's Prince Andrew married Sarah Ferguson at Westminster Abbey in London. (The couple divorced in 1996.)

In 1990, President George H.W. Bush announced his choice of Judge David Souter of New Hampshire to succeed retiring Justice William J. Brennan on the U.S. Supreme Court.


Ten years ago: President Bill Clinton rejoined the troubled Middle East talks at Camp David after hurrying back from a four-day trip to Asia. Leaders of the major industrial countries concluded their summit in Japan by announcing a campaign to slash the number of deaths worldwide from AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Lance Armstrong clinched his second straight victory in the Tour de France. Tiger Woods, at 24, became the youngest player to win the career Grand Slam with a record-breaking performance in the British Open. Karrie Webb, 25, won the U.S. Women's Open.

Five years ago: Multiple bomb blasts in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheik (shahrm ehl shayk) killed at least 64 people. London police acknowledged that Jean Charles de Menezes, the man they'd shot and killed on a subway car in front of horrified commuters, had nothing to do with recent bombings of the city's transit system. Accordionist Myron Floren died in Los Angeles County at age 85.

One year ago: Michael Jackson's personal physician, Dr. Conrad Murray, was named in a search warrant as the target of a manslaughter probe into the singer's death. Authorities arrested 44 people in New Jersey in a corruption probe. Mark Buehrle of the Chicago White Sox pitched the 18th perfect game in major league history, a 5-0 win over Tampa Bay.


Thought for Today:
"To be proud and inaccessible is to be timid and weak." - Jean Baptiste Massillon (zhahn bah-TEEST' mah-see-YOHN'), French clergyman (1663-1742).



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Palestinian Authority: Redundant but Dangerous Language


by Ramzy Baroud

July 23, 2010




Each time Israel fails to keep its ‘side of the bargain’, the Palestinian Authority responds with the same redundant language. The cycle has become so utterly predictable that one wonders why the Palestinian Authority officials even bothers protesting Israeli action. They must be well aware that their cries, genuine or otherwise, will only fall on deaf ears. They know that their complaints could not possible contribute to a paradigm shift in Israel’s behavior, or the US position on it.



Let’s take a look at the context for the language of the Palestinian Authority’s complaints. In a speech made in early July, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas referred to any direct talks with Israel as ‘futile.’ Thousands of newspapers and news sites beamed this ‘headline’, highlighting the word ‘futile’ between inverted commas - as if it constituted some kind of earth-shattering revelation. But anyone following the Middle East, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular already knows that such talks will be ‘futile’. More, Israel has hardly made secret its lack of desire for a peaceful and just settlement.



Mr. Abbas, however, has managed to insert his relevance as a ‘player’ in the conflict, using one cleverly coined word. This word has had as much of an impact in Arabic as has in English.



Of course, none of this means that Abbas has actually adopted a serious shift in course. One need not dig up old archives to remember that the PA president felt the same way about the so-called ‘proximity talks’ with Israel last May. Before they began, he also expressed his opinion that the talks would be futile. He further insisted that no talks, direct or otherwise, would resume without a complete Israeli halt in settlement constructions in occupied East Jerusalem. After this grand declaration, Abbas went along with the proximity talks charade, while Palestinian families continued to be uprooted from their homes in their historic city. Only one barrier was removed before embarking on the proximity talks: Abbas and his men quit complaining.



Nearly two months later, when it is evident to all that the proximity talks were indeed ‘futile’ – especially as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has triumphed over US President Barack Obama in his most recent visit to Washington – Mr. Abbas finds himself in desperate need for another line of defense. Thus, the new campaign attacking predictably ‘futile’ direct talks with Israel.



Mr. Abbas is not the only actor in this drama. Others have also been doing their job, as efficiently and as true to form as ever. Yasser Abed Rabbo, who has worn several hats in the past and is now one of Mr. Abbas’s aides, stated that the PA “will not enter new negotiations that could take more than 10 years.” This promise - that the Palestinian leadership will not be fooled into talks for the sake of talking and with no timeframe – is not the first of its kind to come from Abed Rabbo, and it’s unlikely to be the last. Abbas’ aide will most likely continue sharing the same tired insight over and over again, because it’s the scripted part that any ‘moderate’ – as in self-seeking – Palestinian official must reiterate to remain relevant. How else could they give the impression that the PA still serves the role of the bulwark against Israeli illegal territorial encroachment and military occupation?



Ahmed Qurei, former Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister and ex-Prime Minister, recently spoke at a Hebrew University Conference, entitled: “The Israeli-Palestinian Proximity Talks: Lessons from Past Negotiations.” The conference was organized by Hebrew University’s Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace. The place and occasion of this conference could not be more significant. First, much of the Hebrew University was built on ‘ethnically cleansed’ Palestinian land. Second, Qurei spoke at an Israeli University in an occupied city, at a time when activists and academics from all over the world, including several from Israel, are leading a cultural and academic boycott of Israeli universities to protest the terrible role these institutions have played in Israeli violence against Palestinians.



Worse, immediately before his speech, Qurei had met with former Israeli Foreign Minister and acting Prime Minister, Tzipi Livni. Livni had ordered and supervised the unprecedented killing and maiming of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009. The level of inhumanity she displayed during those days was met with outrage around the world, including from many in Israel itself. But all the blood was brushed under the carpet, as “Livni (and) Abu Ala exchange(d) ‘niceties’”, according to the Jerusalem Post.



Just try to imagine the fury that all Palestinians - and especially those besieged in destroyed Gaza – must have felt as Qurei and Livni shook hands and smiled for cameras. As for Qurei’s academic and political contributions, the Post reported that, “at the conference, Qurei said Netanyahu had not really frozen West Bank settlement construction, and added that Israel’s actions were preventing direct talks.”



Considering the numerous compromises that Qurei afforded in his very attendance of the conference, and his handshaking with Livni, one fails to understand the point of such statements.



These empty declarations will have no bearing on the outcome of events, nor will they force Netanyahu and his right-wing government to think twice as they carry on demolishing homes and uprooting trees. But they are more important than ever for the PA, as voices are rising in Washington, in London and elsewhere, demanding that the US and its partners acknowledge, if not ‘engage’ Hamas. Such a prospect is bad news for the West Bank Palestinian leadership, which understands that its relevance to the ‘peace process’ hinges on the constant dismissal of Hamas. Therefore, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah will continue to adhere to its methodology: don’t criticize Israel too harshly, so as not to lose favor; follow the US dictates, so as to maintain a ‘moderate’ status and many privileges; and always give an impression to Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims that the PA is the one and only defender of Jerusalem.



One wonders how much longer the Palestinian leadership can sustain this act, which is in fact the real exercise of futility.



Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press, London), now available on Amazon.com.

Ramzy Baroud is a frequent contributor to Global Research.


``````````````````````````````````````````````````





–by Ravi Somaiya
July 23, 2010


N. Korea Threatens 'Physical Response' Against U.S. and S. Korea

Pyongyang unhappy that the two allies will conduct joint military exercises in the region.
The U.S. will hold military drills with South Korea beginning Sunday, just days after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled sanctions against North Korea -- widely blamed for sinking a South Korean warship in March. Pyongyang is up in arms.

Clinton has not pulled her punches on this trip to Asia. She revealed the sanctions, which will target North Korea's ruling elite, according to Reuters, on Wednesday. Yesterday, speaking at the ASEAN Regional Forum for Asia-Pacific countries in Hanoi, she mentioned concerns about a growing relationship between the military dictatorship in Burma and Pyongyang. "We know that a ship from North Korea recently delivered military equipment to Burma and we continue to be concerned by the reports that Burma may be seeking assistance from North Korea with regard to a nuclear program," she said, after a meeting with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, according to CNN.

Today she called on other nations in the region to strongly enforce the sanctions against North Korea and put pressure on Burma to hold free and fair elections. "One measure of the strength of a community of nations is how it responds to threats to its members, neighbors and region," she told the forum, according to Reuters.

China, one of the 27 countries that make up the forum, and a long-time supporter of North Korea, signaled its posture by insisting that the military exercises, which will feature 20 ships and 200 planes, according to the New Yorker, not take place in the Yellow Sea, off China's shores. It eventually got its way. They will be held in the Sea of Japan.


Pyongyang was -- typically -- less measured. The North Korean government still rejects strong evidence that it torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan in March, sinking it and killing 46 sailors. Reuters reports that a North Korean diplomat representing the country at the forum said recent moves by the U.S. had brought the Korean peninsula "to the brink of explosion." Ri Tong-il told reporters that there would be "a physical response to the steps imposed by the United States militarily," adding that the situation was a threat to North Korean sovereignty.



`````````````````````````````````````````````````````



World court to rule on Kosovo independence
By MIKE CORDER (AP) –

THE HAGUE, Netherlands — The United Nations' highest court is issuing an advisory opinion Thursday on whether Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia was legal, a ruling that could set a precedent for separatist regions around the world.

The International Court of Justice advice is nonbinding, but it is expected to renew pressure for a resumption of talks between Belgrade and Pristina about Kosovo's future status.

However, at a court hearing last December, Kosovo's Foreign Minister Skender Hyseni said it would be "inconceivable" to reopen negotiations and warned that the court's opinion "could even spark new conflict in the region."

Kosovo's majority ethnic Albanians decided to split from Serbia after almost two years of internationally monitored talks failed with Serbia.

Kosovo has been recognized as an independent state by 69 countries, including the United States and most EU nations. But a diplomatic campaign by Serbia has prevented more countries from recognizing Kosovo, which Serbs consider the cradle of their national identity.

Serbian Orthodox Church elders ordered all their churches in Serbia and Kosovo to toll their bells Thursday at 5 p.m. for five minutes — when the decision is expected to be announced — as a prayer for a favorable ruling by the court.

Serbian President Boris Tadic said Wednesday he expects that the court will rule that Kosovo Albanians had no legal right to secede.

"If the International Court of Justice sets a new principle, it would trigger a process that would create several new countries and destabilize numerous regions in the world," he added.

Kosovo's prime minister, Hashim Thaci, said he did not expect "winners or losers" to emerge from the court's opinion.

"I expect this to be a correct decision, according to the will of Kosovo's citizen. Kosovo will respect the advisory opinion," Thaci told The Associated Press by phone.

He said he expected the decision to "open up a new perspective for integration into NATO and the EU and a new set of relations and cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia as two partner countries."

International law expert Bibi van Ginkel of the Clingendael think tank in The Hague said the judges have to weigh the right of a sovereign state to territorial integrity against the right of a people to self-determination.

"Both are fundamental rights in international law," Van Ginkel said.

NATO bombed Serbia for 78 days in 1999 to end a brutal crackdown by Serb forces against Kosovo's separatist ethnic Albanians. About 10,000 ethnic Albanians were killed and close to 1 million forced from their homes in the fighting. Hundreds of Serbs were also killed in retaliatory attacks by Kosovo separatists.

Countries with separatist regions, such as Spain and China, weighed into the debate last year, saying they oppose Kosovo independence.

China's representative at the hearings, Xue Hanqin, told judges that Kosovo is and should remain an integral part of Serbia.

"Given the vital importance of territory, no state would accept that any of its component parts may secede from it without its consent," Xue said.

U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh disagreed, saying that the United States, "a nation born of a declaration of independence more than two centuries ago," urged the court to leave Kosovo alone.

"Serbia now seeks an opinion by this court that would turn back time ... (and) undermine the progress and stability that Kosovo's Declaration has brought to the region," Koh said.

Fred Cocozzelli, a politics expert at St. John's University in New York who has written on post-conflict reconstruction, said he expected the court to try to avoid setting a precedent unless it is to underscore how separatists in Kosovo involved the international community to manage its bid for secession.

"So in other cases, it would then be upon the separatist forces to follow that same pattern of allowing for international intervention, of not demanding sovereignty but agreeing to cooperate with the U.N. and other institutions," he said.

Associated Press Writer Nebi Qena in Pristina contributed to this report.




~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

VATICAN CITY, Rome, Italy




Pope Benedict XVI on Tuesday called for a radical rethinking of the global economy, criticizing a growing divide between rich and poor and urging the establishment of a “true world political authority” to oversee the economy and work for the “common good.”

He criticized the current economic system, “where the pernicious effects of sin are evident,” and urged financiers in particular to “rediscover the genuinely ethical foundation of their activity.”

He also called for “greater social responsibility” on the part of business. “Once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty,” Benedict wrote in his new encyclical, which the Vatican released on Tuesday.

More than two years in the making, “Caritas in Veritate,” or “Charity in Truth,” is Benedict’s third encyclical since he became pope in 2005. Filled with terms like “globalization,” “market economy,” “outsourcing,” “labor unions” and “alternative energy,” it is not surprising that the Italian media reported that the Vatican was having difficulty translating the 144-page document into Latin.

Reportedly delayed to take into consideration the financial crisis, it was released by the Vatican on the eve of the Group of 8 industrialized nations summit meeting, which opens in Italy on Wednesday, and before Benedict is expected to receive President Obama at the Vatican on Friday.

“It’s not an encyclical done for the crisis,” Cardinal Renato Martino, the president of the Vatican’s Council for Justice and Peace, said at a news conference on Tuesday. Still, he added, “if the encyclical had come out before the crisis, you would have said it was prophetic.”

In the encyclical, Benedict wrote that “financiers must rediscover the genuinely ethical foundation of their activity, so as not to abuse the sophisticated instruments which can serve to betray the interests of savers.”

In many ways, the document is a puzzling cross between an anti-globalization tract and a government white paper, another signal that the Vatican does not comfortably fit into traditional political categories of right and left.

“There are paragraphs that sound like Ayn Rand, next to paragraphs that sound like ‘The Grapes of Wrath.’ That’s quite intentional,” Vincent J. Miller, a theologian at the University of Dayton, a Catholic institution in Ohio, said by telephone.

“He’ll wax poetically about the virtuous capitalist, but then he’ll give you this very clear analysis of the ways in which global capital and the shareholder system cause managers to focus on short-term good at the expense of the community, of workers, of the environment.”

Indeed, sometimes Benedict sounds like an old-school European socialist, lamenting the decline of the social welfare state and praising the “importance” of labor unions to protect workers. Without stable work, he noted, people lose hope and tend not to get married and have children.

But he also wrote, “The so-called outsourcing of production can weaken the company’s sense of responsibility towards the stakeholders — namely the workers, the suppliers, the consumers, the natural environment and broader society — in favor of the shareholders.” And he argued that it was “erroneous to hold that the market economy has an inbuilt need for a quota of poverty and underdevelopment in order to function at its best.”

Benedict also called for a reform of the United Nations so there could be a unified “global political body” that allowed the less powerful of the earth to have a voice, and he called on rich nations to help less fortunate ones.

“In the search for solutions to the current economic crisis, development aid for poor countries must be considered a valid means of creating wealth for all,” he wrote.

John Sniegocki, a professor of Christian ethics at Xavier University in Cincinnati, said one of the most controversial elements of the encyclical, at least for some Americans, would be the call for international institutions to play a role in regulating the economy.

“One of the things he’s saying is that the global economy is escaping the power of individual states to regulate it,” Mr. Sniegocki said. He said the encyclical also contained elements “very critical” of how the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank “have required cuts in social spending in the third world.”

Michael Novak, a philosopher and theologian at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, a conservative research organization, said he thought that the encyclical was stronger on principles than policy suggestions. He said he was particularly uncomfortable with the idea of a strong international institution to regulate the global economy.

“I like limited government. I would much prefer to have many limited governments than one overriding authority,” Mr. Novak said by telephone.

Benedict, arguably the most environmentally conscious pope in history, wrote, “One of the greatest challenges facing the economy is to achieve the most efficient use — not abuse — of natural resources, based on a realization that the notion of ‘efficiency’ is not value-free.”

Rachel Donadio reported from Vatican City, and Laurie Goodstein from New York.

Source: New York Times



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mali confirms military action by border

By Tiemoko Diallo| Thu Jul 22, 2010 4:02pm EDT

BAMAKO (Reuters)-

Military action involving unidentified aircraft took place overnight in northern Mali where a French national is believed held by al Qaeda's North African wing, Malian officials said on Thursday.

Shots were fired in the operation late on Wednesday which took place days before a deadline set by the Islamic group for killing 78-year-old Michel Germaneau, who was seized on April 22 in northern Niger.

"There were clashes in the area, shots were heard. We don't know if it was clashes between soldiers and the hostage-takers," said a senior official in the Kidal region of northern Mali by the border with Niger and Algeria.

"There were lots of comings and goings of military airplanes at the airport of Tessalit," the source added. Separately a military source in Bamako confirmed there had been clashes.

A regional security source said a military operation linked to the French hostage had taken place but it was not clear which country's forces were involved or whether it had succeeded.

Spain's El Pais daily quoted diplomatic sources as saying French special forces had staged a dawn attack aimed at freeing Germaneau, killing six "terrorists" but finding no sign of the hostage or of the base where he was believed to be held, and which they had located with U.S. help.

It said the Spanish government was informed just before the operation and was deeply concerned for the safety of two Spanish hostages believed to have been held by the same group for the last eight months.

No one was available at the Spanish Foreign Ministry to comment on the report.

A spokesman for the French armed forces headquarters in Paris said: "For the moment, we have nothing to communicate on the matter. We don't have enough elements."

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) gave France 15 days from July 12 to arrange a prisoner exchange and said French President Nicolas Sarkozy would be responsible for the life of the retired engineer, who had worked in the Algerian oil sector.

Germaneau is the latest in a string of Western hostages who have fallen prey to a new tactic by armed groups in the region, often claiming allegiance to al Qaeda, to secure funding.

AQIM released a picture and audio of Germaneau in May in which he said he had a serious medical condition, and urged Sarkozy to find a "good solution" for him.

Earlier, the French Foreign Ministry said Paris was working to free Germaneau but would remain discreet on its methods to ensure success.

"(Our team) is mobilized to come to the help of our citizen," a ministry spokeswoman told reporters.

Niger military sources said earlier they had no information on the whereabouts of the Frenchman, but that leaders across the region, including Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore, were playing a role in negotiations.

"It's true that the ultimatum is nearing, but I'm certain diplomacy will prevail," said a Niger army officer. "Mali's head of state is fighting for that and he is being helped by a few of his regional counterparts."

France has previously launched military operations to save hostages. Last year, navy commandos intervened to rescue tourists kidnapped off the coast of Somalia.

This month Mali invited Algerian forces to pursue into its territory al Qaeda insurgents sought for the killing of 11 Algerian paramilitary police. It was not clear whether Algeria took up the offer.

(Reporting by John Irish in Paris, David Lewis in Dakar and Abdoulaye Massalaatchi in Niamey; writing by Mark John, editing by Myra MacDonald)




~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SUBJECT: Egypt-Turkey presidents meet

QUOTE: " 'If Turkey is to resume playing its part in regional issues, its
troubled relations with Israel will not help it' "



Egypt urged Turkey on Wednesday (21 July)to ease current tensions
in the latter's relations with Israel in order to restore the Turkish role
in resolving regional disputes.
Cairo denied the existence of competition with Ankara in terms of regional
leadership, saying that Turkey’s diplomatic role merely complemented its
own.
“If Turkey is to resume playing its part in regional issues, its troubled
relations with Israel will not help it-- and Ankara is aware of this fact,”
said presidential spokesman Suleiman Awwad.
In a press statement following a meeting between Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak and Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul, Awwad told reporters that,
“Both the Israeli and Turkish sides will work on containing tensions by a
number of means, which were reflected at a recent meeting between Israeli
Infrastructure Minister Benjamen Ben Eliazer and Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu" in Munich, Germany.
Awwad went on to stress that the tension had a negative impact on the two
countries' ability to play their roles or to offer mediation. Awwad also
hoped for progress on the Syria-Israel peace track, with Turkey and Arab
states contributing on this front.
“Egypt is not afraid of the part Turkey is playing in the region”, Awwad
noted. “Egypt is not seeking a renewed regional standing since its role has
been secure for years. The Palestinian factions admit the centrality of our
role.”
Asked whether Turkey would be permitted to take part in the reconciliation
process between Palestinian factions, Awwad answered: "The Turkish role
completes Egypt’s role, as has been noted by Turkey’s president, prime
minister and foreign minister.”
He added that Turkey was attempting to consummate Egypt’s role by providing
support both on the level of peace negotiations and in terms of Palestinian
reconciliation. Awwad concluded by saying that Egypt remained adamant in its
position on the issue.

+++SOURCE: Saudi Gazette 22 July '10:"The good, the bad and the ugly",By
Ramesh
Balan

SUBJECT: Good Taliban --Bad Taliban

QUOTE:"One point missed in all of this is, what happens then to the 'bad
Taliban' and al-Qaeda ? As of now, they are all having a blast in Pakistan
assembling bombs and making AK-47s"


Afghanistan is going Iraq’s way. That’s the short point emerging
from Tuesday’s first ever international conference hosted by post-Taliban
Afghanistan.

It took approximately six hours, with four-minute speeches by each delegate,
for US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
and some 40 foreign ministers among other delegates from over 70 countries
and international organizations, to decide that post-Taliban Afghanistan
will last until 2014, the new deadline for the US and European countries to
prepare the high moral ground for a last-ditch attempt at making a decent
exit from the conflict.
If all goes as planned, the “good Taliban” will be back in power by then,
the notoriously fractious Afghan people will be masters of their own
individual destinies (a la democratic Iraq today and not necessarily a good
thing), and President Hamid Karzai, if at all he survives that long, will be
good for nothing.
One point missed in all this is, what happens then to the “bad Taliban” and
Al-Qaeda? As of now, they are all having a blast in Pakistan, assembling
bombs, and making AK-47s and rock launchers in the arms bazaars across the
lawless northwest bordering Afghanistan. And if the international pipe-dream
of cleansing Afghanistan ever becomes reality, these terrorists and
extremists – no small number by every estimation – will have to stay put in
Pakistan. The government there – civilian or military it won’t make a
difference – will then be left with no choice but to force the whole lot of
battle hardened extremists into Pakistan-held Kashmir for periodic flushing
further down into the Indian-held portion of the disputed territory. Ugly.
Clinton made that scenario quite ominous when she said that the US remains
steadfast about keeping out of the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir.
Nonetheless, she did assuage India’s concerns over the looming spillover of
murderous zealots from Pakistan with a blunt assertion that “elements in the
Pakistan government, particularly its intelligence establishment, know the
whereabouts of Osama.”
“Look, you’ve got to take on every nongovernmental armed group inside your
country, because even though you think they won’t bother you today, there is
no guaranteee,” Clinton said in an interview to a Pakistan news channel. “It’s
like keeping a poisonous snake in your backyard,” she warned, reiterating
yet again that weary old line about America not being satisfied until it
gets Osama.

For India, any slackening by the US in its war on terror can spell eventual
doom in Kashmir. Unless these terrorists and extremists are snuffed out,
either by an international community alarmed over how much control the
“establishment” has over Pakistan’s nuclear bombs, or by what’s left of
Pakistan without its “establishment”, the world will not be a safer place.
Afghanistan has so far served as a costly distraction in the global war on
terror. The US invasion has neither weakened the Taliban nor made any
noticeable dent on Al-Qaeda. On the contrary, all that has transpired is a
Pakistan that is imploding. The civilian government there, despite its best
intentions, is held hostage by its existential need to either appease its
increasingly hostile extremist population or play second fiddle to the
so-called “establishment.”

From India, make no mistake, there will be no forgiveness forthcoming for
the 26/11 Mumbai bombings – no democratically - elected government will get
the mandate or have the courage to let the age-old roadblocks in the
Indo-Pakistan peace process sidetrack Islamabad’s primary obligation of
first bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to book.
India’s allegations are not unfounded. And Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah
Mehmood Qureshi’s propensity to hit the nail firmly on the thumb every time
an attempt is made to restart bilateral talks – starting with the core issue
of terrorism – is viewed by the Indian media as simply nothing but a novice’s
undisguised fumbling in the face of inescapable reality. Terrorism is here
to stay as the core issue between India and Pakistan and the sooner that
message gets past Qureshi to the powers that be in the “establishment”, no
progress need be expected in Indo-Pak talks.
Is Indian making a needless fuss about perceived Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism?
India’s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon thinks not. He said at a
seminar jointly organized by the ORF Foundation and the conservative
Heritage Foundation, that his worst thoughts expressed at a similar forum a
year ago have come true. “It is today actually even less possible to be
optimistic about the success of existing counter-terrorism strategies in
South Asia – in Pakistan or in Afghanistan,” he told the delegates.
For now, India’s may be a cry in the wilderness but rest assured the entire
country will keep hollering away until Pakistan finds a way – or is forced –
to convincingly make amends. – SG
=========
Sue Lerner - Associate, IMRA